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Abstract. The present paper approaches ontology and meta-ontology
through Mathematics, and more precisely through category theory. We
exploit the theory of elementary toposes to claim that a satisfying “the-
ory of existence”, and more at large ontology itself, can both be obtained
by means of category theory. For us, an ontology is a mathematical ob-
ject: it is a category E , the universe of discourse in which our Mathe-
matics (intended at large, as a theory of knowledge) can be deployed.
The internal language that all categories possess, in the particular case
of an elementary topos, is induced by the presence of an object ΩE
parametrizing the truth values of the internal propositional calculus;
such pair (E ,ΩE) prescribes the modes of existence for the objects of a
fixed ontology/category.
This approach resembles, but is more general than, the one leading
to fuzzy logics, as most choices of E and thus of ΩE yield nonclassical,
many-valued logics.
Framed this way, ontology suddenly becomes more mathematical:
a solid corpus of techniques can be used to backup philosophical intuition
with a useful, modular language, suitable for a practical foundation.
As both a test-bench for our theory, and a literary divertissement,
we propose a possible category-theoretic solution of the famous Tlo¨n’s
“nine copper coins” paradox, and of other seemingly paradoxical con-
struction in Jorge Luis Borges’ literary work.
We conclude with some vistas on the most promising applications
of our future work.
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1. Introduction
El mundo, desgraciadamente, es real.
[11]
This is the first chapter of a series of works aiming to touch a pretty
wide range of topics.
Its purpose is to adopt a wide-ranging approach to a fragment of elemen-
tary problems in a certain branch of contemporary philosophy of Mathemat-
ics. More in detail, we attempt at laying a foundation for solving a number of
problems in ontology employing pure Mathematics; in particular, using the
branch of Mathematics known as category theory.
As authors, we are aware that such an ambitious statement of purpose
must be adequately motivated, bounded to a realistic goal, and properly
framed in the current state of the art on the matter. This is the scope of the
initial section of the present first manuscript.
1.1. What is this series
Since forever, Mathematics studies three fundamental indefinite terms: form,
measure, and inference. Apperception makes us recognise that there are ex-
tended entities in space, persisting in time. From this, the necessity to mea-
sure how much these entities are extended, and to build a web of conceptual
relations between them, explaining how they arrange ‘logically’. Contamina-
tion between these three archetypal processes is certainly possible and com-
mon: in fact, Mathematics happens exactly at the crossroad where algebra,
geometry and logic intersect.
We can even say more: Mathematics is a language engineered to sys-
tematically infer properties of the three mentioned indefinite; so, meta-Math-
ematics done through Mathematics (if such a thing even exists) exhibits the
features of a ur-language, a generative scheme for ‘all’ possible languages. It
is a language whose elements are the rules to give oneself a language, con-
vey information to other selves, and allow deduction. It is a meta-object, a
scheme of rules to generate objects/languages.
Taken this tentative definition, Mathematics (not its history, not its
philosophy, but its practice) serves as a powerful tool to tackle the essential
questions of ontology: what things are cogently, what makes them what they
are and not different.
Quantitative thinking is a consistent (some would say ‘honest’) way of
approaching the deep problem of the cogency of entities; yet, it is undeniable
that a certain philosophical debate has become indifferent, or even overtly
hostile, to mathematical language. A tear in the veil that occurred a long
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time ago, due to different purposes and different specific vocabulary, can not
be repaired by two people only. If, however, the reader of these notes asks for
an extended motivation for our work, a wide-ranging project in which it fits,
a long-term goal, in short, a program, they will find it now: there is a piece of
Mathematics whose purpose is to solve philosophical problems, in the same
sense certain Mathematics ‘solves’ the motion of celestial bodies.
It does not annihilate the question: it proposes models within which one
can reformulate it; it highlights what is a trivial consequence of the axioms of
that model and what instead is not, and requires the language to be expanded,
modified, sharpened. We aim to approach this never-mentioned discipline as
mathematicians. But we do it without elaborating ‘new’ theorems; we draw
connections between the modern mathematical practice to use them in the
context of philosophical research.
Sure, solving once and for all the problems posited by ontology would be
megalomaniac; we do not claim to have reached such an ambitious objective.
More modestly, we propose a starting point unhinging some well-established
beliefs;1 we humbly point the finger at some problems that prose is unable to
notice, because it lacks a specific and technical language; we suggest that only
in such a language, when words mean precise things and are tools of epistemic
research instead of mere magic spells, a few essential questions of recent
ontology dissolve in a thin thread of smoke, and others simply become ‘the
wrong question’: not false, just meaningless; meaningless as the endeavour
to bestow a concrete attribute as a temperature to abstract concept like
consciousness or justice.
We shall say at the outset that the ur-language we are tackling is not
Mathematics. Yet, mathematical language has an enormous potential to hint
at what the elementary particles of the characteristica universalis we’re look-
ing for should be made of.
It may also seem suspicious to employ Mathematics to tackle questions
that traditionally pertain to philosophy: some philosophers believe they are
debating about problems more general than Mathematics, from a higher point
of observation on the fundamental questions of Being. By proposing the ‘on-
tology as categories’ point of view, our work aims to dismantle such a false
belief.
In doing so, we believe we can provide a more adequate language, taken
from Mathematics, within which to frame some deep ontological questions,
whose potential is often lost in the threads of ill-posed questions and clumsy
answers. The reader will allow a tongue-in-cheek here, subsuming our posi-
tion: in ontology, it is not a matter of making a correct use of language, but
rather a matter of using the correct language.
This correct language is inherently mathematical, as only Mathematics
proved to be able to substantiate a qualitative analysis in quantitative terms.
1Above all else, the belief that ontology is too general to be approached quantitatively, and
that it contains mathematical language as a proper subclass: it is instead the exact opposite,
as the central idea of our work is that ontologies -there are many- are mathematical objects.
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This language ‘must be’ category theory, as only category theory has the
power to speak about a totality of structures of a given kind in a compelling
way, treating mathematical theories as mathematical objects.
As of now, our work unravels in three different chapters, and it will
attempt to cover a variety of topics:
• the present manuscript, Existence, provides the tools to build a suffi-
ciently expressive ‘theory of existence’ inside a category. This first chap-
ter has a distinctly foundational roˆle; its scope to build the fundamentals
of our tool-set (category theory and categorical logic, as developed in
[52, 39, 42]).
As both a test-bench for our theory and a literary divertissement,
we propose a category-theoretic solution of Borges’ paradoxes present
in [10]. In our final section, we relate our framework to more classical
ancient and modern philosophers; we link topos theory to Berkeley’s
instantaneism and internal category theory to Quine’s definition of the
[domain of] existence of an entity as a domain of validity of quantifiers
(intended as propositional functions, i.e. functions whose codomain is a
space of truth values).
• A second chapter [23], currently in preparation, addresses the problem
of identity, and in particular its context-dependent nature. Our proof of
concept here consists of a rephrasing of Black’s classical ‘two spheres’
paradox [6] in the elementary terms of invariance under a group of ad-
missible transformations; this time the solution is provided by Klein’s
famous Erlangen program group-theoretic foundation for geometry: the
two interlocutors of Black’s imaginary dialogue respectively live in an
Euclidean and an affine world: this difference, not perceived by means
of language, affects their understanding of the ‘two’ spheres, and irre-
deemably prevents them from mutual intelligence.
• A third chapter [24], currently in preparation, addresses again the prob-
lem of identity, but this time through the lens of algebraic topology, a
branch of Mathematics that in recent years defied well-established onto-
logical assumptions ; the many commonalities between category theory
and homotopy theory suggest that ‘identity’ is not a primitive concept,
but instead depends on our concrete representation of mathematical en-
tities. This can be formalised in various ways, among many the Homo-
topy Type Theory foundation of [69, 43]. [24] aims to be an introduction
to the fundamental principles of HoTT ad usum delphini : we investigate
how when X,Y : C are objects in a category, there often is a class of
equivalences W ⊆ hom(C) prescribing that X,Y shouldn’t be distin-
guished in the associated ontology; equality is then defined ex post in
terms of W , varying as the ambient category C does; this yields a W -
parametric notion of identity ≡W , allowing categories to be categorified
versions of Bishop sets, i.e. pairs (S, ρ) where ρ is an equivalence relation
on S prescribing a ρ-equality.
Categorical Ontology I: Existence 5
Our main tenet in the present chapter is that ontologies are mathematical
objects: each ontology is a certain category O, inside which ‘Being’ unravels
as the sum of all statements that the internal language (see 4.1) of O can
concoct.
Of course, the more expressive is this language, the more expressive the
resulting theory of existence will turn out to be. Our presupposition here is
that trying to let ontology speak about ‘all that there is’ (the accent is on the
adverb, on the famous quote of Quine [63]) can lead to annoying paradoxes
and foxholes.
Instead research shall concentrate on clarifying what the verb means:
in what sense, ‘what there is’ is? What is is-ness? As category theorists, our
-perhaps simplistic- answer is that, again paraphrasing Quine,
being is being the object of a category.
Explaining why this is exactly Quine’s motto, just shifted one universe
higher, is the content of our §6.3.
1.1.1. Structure of the paper. The remaining part of the first section
draws a picture as accurate as possible, of the wheres and whys of structural
Mathematics; its implications are the subject of several essays on the philos-
ophy of Mathematics, like [40, 54, 55, 56]. This section has several different
purposes: it provides an explicit statement of purposes for the entire polyp-
tych [23, 24]; it declares our stance on the foundation we choose, clarifying
assumptions that we feel are usually neglected on essays on the topic (‘where
are the objects that Mathematics aims to describe? Where is the language
by means of which this description is possible?’) -of course without claiming
to have solved the matter once and for all; we provide pointers as specific as
possible in order to help the reader navigate the relevant literature.
The second section delves into the first major point of our presenta-
tion: large categories are universes where ‘Being’, intended as the sum of
information acquired from the perceptual bundle we experience, that lan-
guage organises and conceptualises. ‘Language’ here is a shortcut to denote
the power of a fixed large category C to express well-formed formulas of (a
certain fragment of) logic. Objects and morphisms of C shall be considered
respectively as types and terms of a language, the internal language of C (see
Definition 4.1); now, the richer C is, the more it is able to faithfully represent
the cosmos we’re thrown into. Among many possible choices for C, we take
toposes as the class of categories harbouring ‘set theories’: the internal lan-
guage of a topos is powerful enough to re-enact set theory, and subsequently
propositional logic.
The third section deals with a specific example of a topos, useful for
later examination: the categories of objects parameterised by a fixed ‘space of
parameters’ I. The ‘slice’ category Set/I is a topos, and its internal language,
namely its internal logic, is tightly linked to set-theoretic properties of the
slicing set I. The logic we obtain in Set/I by casting the general definitions
of subobject classifier ?? and internal language is genuinely non-classical.
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The fourth section contains a careful analysis of the internal language
of Set/I.
The fifth section contains an application of the tools we exposed until
now: the seemingly paradoxical ‘nine copper coins’ problem exposed in Jorge
Luis Borges’ [10], far from being paradoxical, admits a natural interpretation
as a statement in Set/I, for a suitable choice of I, and thus of the induced in-
ternal logic. We propose other examples of seemingly paradoxical statements
in Borges’ literary work that instead are admissible statements in the internal
logic of some topos: on Tlo¨n entities may disappear if neglected: this means
that I is linearly ordered; Babylon’s chaotic lottery resembles, with their ob-
scure, impenetrable purposes, the chaotic behaviour of a dynamical system:
this means that I carries a semigroup action; Tlo¨n’s instantaneism, mimick-
ing/mocking Berkeley, can be obtained assuming I is a discrete, uncountable
set.
We close the paper with a section on future development, vistas for fu-
ture applications, and with a wrap-up of the discussion as we have unraveled
so far. Ideally, §3 and §4 shall be skipped by readers already having some ac-
quaintance with category theory; the second half of the paper makes however
heavy use of the notation established before.
1.2. On the choice of a meta-theory and a foundation
Along the 20th century, the discipline of Mathematics divided into different
sub-classes, each with their specific problems and its specific language, just
to find, soon after, unification under a single notion of structure, through
the notion of abstract category [26]. This process led to an epistemological
revision of Mathematics and has inspired, parallel to the development of
operative tools, a revision of both the foundations of Mathematics and the
purposes of its research.
According to many, it is undeniable that
[the] mathematical uses of the tool ‘category theory’ and episte-
mological considerations having category theory as their object
cannot be separated, neither historically nor philosophically. [40]
Structural-mathematical practice, i.e. the practice of everyday Mathe-
matics directed by structural meta-principles, produced a ‘natural’ choice for
the underlying meta-ontology of Mathematics2 which, later, felt the need to
2Perhaps improperly, the locution meta-ontology of Mathematics is used here to refer to
the totality of operative beliefs inspiring the ergonomic of mathematical objects. Some
of these principles are: objects not enjoying a universal property shall be discarded; def-
initions that are isomorphism-invariant shall be preferred over those who are not; both
these commandments are based on the idea that classes of mathematical objects arrange
in coherent conglomerates exhibiting more structure than the mere aggregation of their
elements: the requests of universality and isomorphism-invariance are meant not to destroy
such additional structure. Examples of these meta-principles can be found in various other
areas of Mathematics.
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be characterized more precisely. Similarly to what Carnap3 suggested regard-
ing semantics,
mathematicians creating their discipline were not seeking to justify
the constitution of the objects studied by making assumptions as
to their ontology. [40]
Beyond the attempts (above all, those of Bourbaki group: but see [51],
historical notes on Ch. 4, for a hint that Bourbaki didn’t really get the point
of structural Mathematics), what matters is that the habit of reasoning in
terms of structures has suggested implicit epistemological and ontological
attitudes. This matter would deserve an exhausting independent inquiry.
For our objectives it’s enough to declare a differentiation that Kro¨mer
elaborated, inspired by [22]: the difference between structuralism and struc-
tural Mathematics:
s) Structuralism: the philosophical position regarding structures as the
subject matter of Mathematics;
s) Structural Mathematics: the methodological approach to look in a given
problem for the structure itself.
Of course, s implies s but the opposite is not always true:
Remark 1.1. That is, one can do structural Mathematics without being
a structuralist and taking different, or even opposite, positions concerning
structuralism itself.
Nevertheless, the use of CT as meta-language, despite the historical link
with structuralism, doesn’t make automatic the transition from s to s; it
just suggests that the ontology is not only dependent on the ‘ideology’ (in a
Quinean sense) of the theory, but it is instead influenced by the epistemolog-
ical model inspired by formal language.
Kro¨mer’s distinction, however, has another virtue: instead of stumbling
in a possibly not ambiguous definition of structure (with the unwanted con-
sequences that could arise in the operational practice), s can be reduced to
(or can redefine) s, saying that:
structuralism is the claim that Mathematics is essentially structural
Mathematics [40]
3Some words that philosophers should keep in mind, on the lawfulness of the use of abstract
entities (specifically mathematical) in semantic reflection, also valid in ontology:
we take the position that the introduction of the new ways of speaking does
not need any theoretical justification because it does not imply any assertion
of reality [...]. it is a practical, not a theoretical question; it is the question of
whether or not to accept the new linguistic forms. The acceptance cannot be
judged as being either true or false because it is not an assertion. It can only
be judged as being more or less expedient, fruitful, conducive to the aim for
which the language is intended. Judgments of this kind supply the motivation
for the decision of accepting or rejecting the kind of entities. [17]
8 Dario Dentamaro† and Fosco Loregian‡
This is the same thing as saying: the structural practice already is its
philosophy.
Attempts to explain the term ‘structure’ by Bourbaki in the years fol-
lowing the publication of the Elements des Mathe´matiques, led to the first
systematic elaboration of a philosophy that we could appropriately call struc-
tural Mathematics. Its target is to ‘assembling all possible ways in which given
set can be endowed with certain structure’ [40], and elaborate, in the program-
matic paper The Architecture of Mathematics (written by Dieudonne´ alone
and published in 1950), a formal strategy. While specifying that ‘this defini-
tion is not sufficiently general for the needs of Mathematics’ [16], the author
encoded a series of operational steps through which a structure on a collection
is assembled set-theoretically. Adopting therefore a reductionist perspective
in which
the structure-less sets are the raw material of structure building
which in Bourbaki’s analysis is ‘unearthed’ in a quasi-archaeologi-
cal, reverse manner; they are the most general objects which can, in
a rewriting from scratch of Mathematics, successively be endowed
with ever more special and richer structures. [40]
On balance, in Bourbaki’s structuralism, the notion of set doesn’t dis-
appear definitively in front of the notion of structure. Times were not ripe
to abandon set theory; the path towards an ‘integral’ structuralism was still
long, and culminated years after, with Lawvere’s attempt at a foundation
ETCS of set theory first [44] and ETCC of category theory (and as a conse-
quence, ‘of all Mathematics’) after [46], through structuralism.
To appreciate the depth and breadth of such an impressive piece of
work, however, the word ‘foundation’ must be taken in the particular sense
intended by mathematicians:
[. . .] a single system of first-order axioms in which all usual math-
ematical objects can be defined and all their usual properties
proved.
Such a position sounds at the same time a bit cryptic to unravel, and
unsatisfactory; Lawvere’s (and others’) stance on the matter is that a foun-
dation of Mathematics is de facto just a set L of first-order axioms organised
in a Gentzen-like deductive system. The deductive system so generated re-
produces Mathematics as we know and practice it, providing a formalisation
for something that already exists and needs no further explanation, and that
we call ‘Mathematics’.
It is not a vacuous truth that L exists somewhere: point is, the fact
that the theory so determined has a nontrivial model, i.e the fact that it can
be interpreted inside a given familiar structure, is at the same time the key
assumption we make, and the less relevant aspect of the construction itself.
Showing that L ‘has a model’ is –although slightly improperly– meant
to ensure that, assuming the existence of a naive set theory (i.e., assuming
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the prior existence of structures called ‘sets’), axioms of L can be satisfied
by a naive set. Alternatively, and more crudely: assuming the existence of a
model of ZFC, L has a model inside that model of ZFC.4
1.3. Our foundation, at last.
A series of works attempting to unhinge some aspects of ontology through
category theory should at least try to tackle such a simple and yet diabolic
question as ‘where’ are the symbols forming the first-order theory ETCC.
And yet, everyone just believes in -some flavour of- sets and solves the issue
of ‘where’ they are with a leap of faith from which all else must follow.
This might appear somewhat circular: aren’t sets in themselves already
a mathematical object? How can they be a piece of the theory they aim to
be a foundation of? In his [50] the author addresses the problem as follows:5
Quando un matematico parla di modelli non ha [. . .] l’impressione
di uscire dall’ambito insiemistico. Questa impressione, che e` cor-
retta, e` giustificata dalla possibilita` di rappresentare i linguaggi
formali con gli oggetti della teoria degli insiemi, di studiare in
essa le relazioni tra le strutture e le rappresentazioni dei simboli.
Quando l’attenzione e` rivolta ai modelli di una teoria degli insiemi,
certe questioni sofistiche non possono pero` essere piu` evitate. La
domanda spontanea sulla relazione che intercorre tra gli insiemi
che sono modelli di una teoria e gli insiemi di cui parla la teoria
non e` altro che una domanda sulla relazione tra la meta-teoria se-
mantica insiemistica e la teoria in esame, o teoria oggetto. Le due
teorie possono coincidere, anzi la meta-teoria puo` essere anche una
sottoteoria propria della teoria oggetto. [. . .]
4It shall be made clear, ensuring that a given theory has a model isn’t driven by psycholog-
ical purposes only: on the one hand, purely syntactic Mathematics would be very difficult
to parse, as opposed to the more colloquial practice of mathematical development; on the
other hand (and this is more important), the only things syntax can see are equality and
truth. To prove that a given statement is false, one either has to check all possible syntactic
derivations leading to ϕ, finding none –this is unpractical, to say the least– or to find a
model where ¬ϕ holds.
5Authors’ translation: When mathematicians talk about models they do not have the im-
pression to have exited a set-theoretic foundation. This impression is correct, and justified
by the possibility to represent formal languages through set theory, to study the relations
among structures and symbolic representations. When mathematicians turn their atten-
tion to models of a set theory, some philosophical questions can however no longer be
avoided. The natural question of what is the relation between the sets that are models of
a theory, and the sets of which the theory talks about is nothing but a question about the
relation between the semantic, set-theoretic meta-theory and the ‘object theory’ we want
to talk about. The two theories can coincide, and in fact the meta-theory can even be a
proper sub-theory of the object theory.
We choose a set whose elements, usually finite sets, represent the symbols of the language
we want to study, and then with a concatenation operation that can be the ‘ordered pair’
construction we define the set of words L of the well-formed formulas, of terms, and the
operation that associates a free variable with a formula, and so on for all syntactic notions.
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Si sceglie un insieme i cui elementi, di solito insiemi finiti,
rappresentano i simboli del linguaggio che si vuole studiare, quindi
con una operazione di concatenazione che puo` essere la coppia ordi-
nata si definisce l’insieme delle parole L delle formule ben formate,
dei termini, l’operazione che a una formula associa le sue variabili
libere, e cos`ı via per tutte le nozioni sintattiche.
The idea that a subtheory L′ ⊂ L of the object theory can play the
roˆle of meta-theory might appear baffling; in practice, the choice is to rely
on one among two possible solutions. Pure Platonism assumes the existence
of a hierarchy of universes harbouring the object theory; pure syntacticism
exploits Go¨del’s completeness theorem: every proof is a finite object, and
every theorem proved in the meta-theory is just a finite string of symbols.
No need for a model.
Platonism has limits: in a fixed a class theory C (MK, Morse-Kelley(-
Mostowski); or NBG, Von Neumann-Bernays-Go¨del), there’s an object V that
plays the roˆle of the universe of sets; in V , all Mathematics can be enacted.
Of course, consistency of C is only granted by an act of faith.
Syntacticism has limits: following it, one abjures any universality Math-
ematics might claim. But syntacticism also has merits: undeniably (disgrace-
fully, luckily) the World is real. And reality is complex enough to contain
languages as purely syntactical objects; the percussion of a log with oxen
bones, rather than prophecies over the entrails of a lamb, or intuitionistic
type theory, all have the same purpose: intersubjective convection of mean-
ing, deduced by a bundle of perceptions, so to gain an advantage, id est some
predictive power, over said perceptions. Of course: intuitionistic type theory
is just slightly more effective than hepatomancy.
Knowledge is obtained by collision and retro-propagation between Re-
ality and the perceptual bundle it generates.
Accepting this, the urge to define seemingly abstract concepts like learn-
ing, conscience, and knowledge, together with precious continuous feedback
coming from real objects, evidently determine an undeniable primacy of quan-
titative thinking, this time intended as machine learning and artificial intelli-
gence, that sets (or should set if only more philosophers knew linear algebra)
a new bar for research in philosophy of mind.
However, we refrain from entering such a deep rabbit-hole, as it would
have catastrophic consequences on the quality, length, and depth of our ex-
position.
The usual choice for mathematicians is to assume that, wherever and
whatever they are, these symbols ‘are’, and our roˆle in unveiling Mathematics
is descriptive rather than generative.6
6Inside (say) a constructivist foundation it is not legitimate to posit that axioms ‘create’
mathematical objects; from this, the legitimacy of the question of where they are, and
the equally legitimate answer ‘nowhere’. The only thing we can say is that they ‘make
precise, albeit implicitly, the meaning of mathematical objects’ [2] (it seems to us that
in Mathematics as well as in philosophy of language, meaning and denotation are safely
kept separate). We take this principle -that the world/meta-model exists and we can just
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This state of affairs has, to the best of our moderate knowledge on the
subject, various possible explanations:
• On one hand, it constitutes the heritage of Bourbaki’s authoritarian
stance on formalism in pure Mathematics;
• on the other hand, a different position would result in barely any differ-
ence for the ‘working-class’; mathematicians are irreducible pragmatists,
somewhat blind to the consequences of their philosophical stances.
So, symbols and letters do not exist outside of the Gentzen-like deductive
system we specified together with L.
As arid as it may seem, this perspective proved itself to be quite useful
in working Mathematics; consider for example the type declaration rules of
a typed functional programming language: such a concise declaration as
data Nat = Z | S Nat
makes no assumption on ‘what’ Z and S :: Nat -> Nat are; instead, it treats
these constructors as meaningful formally (in terms of the admissible deriva-
tions a well-formed expression is subject to) and intuitively (in terms of the
fact that they model natural numbers: every data structure that has those
two constructors must be the type N of natural numbers -provided data con-
structors like S are all injective).
Taken as an operative rule, this reveals exactly what is our stance to-
wards foundations: we are ‘structuralist in the meta-theory’, meaning that
we treat the symbols of a first-order theory or the constructors of a type
system regardless of their origin, provided the same relation occur between
criptomorphic collections of labelled atoms.
In this precise sense, we are thus structuralists in the meta-theory, and
yet we do so with a grain of salt, maintaining a transparent approach to the
consequences and limits of this partialisation. On the one hand, pragmatism
works; it generates rules of evaluation for the truth of sentences. On the
other hand, this sounds like a Munchhausen-like explanation of its the value,
in terms of itself. Yet there seems to be no way to do better: answering the
initial question ‘where are the letters of ETCC?’ would result in no less than
a foundation of language.
And this for no other reason than ‘our’ meta-theory is something near to
a structuralist theory of language; thus, a foundation for such a meta-theory
shall inhabit a meta-meta-theory. . . and so on.
Thus, rather than trying to revert this state of affairs we silently comply
to it as everyone else does; but we feel contempt after a brief and honest
declaration of intents towards where our meta-theory lives. Such a meta-
theory hinges again on work of Lawvere, and especially on his series of works
on functorial semantics.
attempt at describing it by means of the language/model- as evident to anyone in a healthy
state of mind, and we leverage it without further question.
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2. Categories as places
故有之以為利，無之以為用。
Laozi XI
The present section has double, complementary purposes: we would like
to narrow the discussion down to the particular flavour in which we interpret
the word ‘category’, but also to expand its meaning to encompass its roˆle as
a foundation for Mathematics. More or less, the idea is that a category is
both an algebraic structure (a microcosm) and a meta-structure in which all
other algebraic structures can be interpreted (a macrocosm).1
In Lawvere’s idea, a certain type of category provides their users with
a sound graphical representation of the defining operation of a certain type
of structure T (see Definition 2.1 below; we take the word universal in the
sense of [33, XV.1]).
Such a perspective allows to concretely build an object representing a
given (fragment of) a language L, and a topos (see ??) obtained as a sort
of universal semantic interpretation of L as internal language. In this topos,
the structure prescribed by L can be retrieved as a category of ‘models’ of
L: this construction is a classical piece of categorical logic, and will not be
recalled in detail.
J. Lambek proposed to use the free topos [on a type theory/lan-
guage] as the ambient world to do Mathematics in; [. . .] Being
syntactically constructed, but universally determined, with higher-
order intuitionistic type theory as internal language, [Lambek] saw
[this structure] as a reconciliation of the three classical schools of
philosophy of Mathematics, namely formalism, Platonism, and in-
tuitionism. [60]
Interpretation, as defined in logical semantics [31], can be seen as a
function t : L? → K that associates elements of a set K to the free variables
of a formula α in the language L? generated by an alphabet L; along with
the history of category theory, subsequent refinements of this fundamental
idea led to revolutionary notions as that of functorial semantics and internal
logic of a topos. As an aside, it shall be noted that the impulse towards this
research was somewhat motivated by the refusal of set-theoretic foundations,
as opposed to more type-theoretic flavoured ones.
1As an aside, we shall at least mention the dangers of too much a naive approach towards
the micro/macrocosm dichotomy: all known algebraic structures can be interpreted in a
category; categories are themselves algebraic structures; there surely must be such a thing
as the theory of categories internal (i.e., interpreted internally) to a given one. Thus,
large categories shall be thought as categories internal to the ‘meta-’category (unfortunate
but unavoidable name) of ‘all’ categories. There surely is a well-developed and expressive
theory of internal categories (see [7, Ch. 8]); but our reader surely has understood that
the two ‘categories’, albeit bearing the same name, shall be considered on totally different
grounds: one merely is a ‘small structure’; the other is a foundational object for that, and
others, structures.
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In the following subsection, we give a more fine-grained presentation of
the philosophical consequences that a ‘meta-theoretical structural’ perspec-
tive has on mathematical ontology.
2.1. Theories and their models
In [46] the author W. Lawvere builds a formal language ETAC encompassing
‘elementary’ category theory, and a theory ETCC for the category of all cat-
egories, yielding a model for ETAC. In this perspective category theory has
a syntax in which categories are just terms. Besides, we are provided with a
metatheory, in which we can consider categories of categories, etc.:
If Φ is any theorem of the elementary theory of abstract categories,
then ∀A(A |= Φ) is a theorem of the basic theory of the category
of all categories. [46]
After this, the author makes the rather ambiguous statement that ‘every
object in a world described by basic theory is, at least, a category ’. This is a
key observation: what is the world described by ETAC, what are its elements?
We posit that the statement shall be interpreted as follows: categories in
Mathematics carry a double nature. They surely are the structures in which
the entities we are interested to describe organise themselves; but on the
other hand, they inhabit a single, big (meta)category of all categories. Such
a big structure is fixed once and for all, at the outset of our discussion, and
it is the place in which we can provide concrete models for ‘small’ categories.
In other words (and this is true also in light of our ??), categories live
on different, almost opposite, grounds: as -small- syntactic objects, that can
be used to model language, and as -big- semantic objects, that can be used
to model meaning.
To fix ideas with a particular example: we posit that there surely is
such a thing as ‘the category of groups’. But on the other hand, groups are
just very specific kinds of sets, so groups are but a substructure of ‘the only
category that exists’.
Sure, such an approach is quite unsatisfactory from a structural per-
spective. It bestows the category of sets with a privileged role that it does
not have: sets are just one of the possible choices for a foundation of Math-
ematics. Instead, we would like to disengage the (purely syntactic) notion of
structure from the (semantic) notion of interpretation.
This is where Lawvere’s intuition comes into play: the ‘categories as
places’ philosophy now provides such a disengagement, to approach the foun-
dation of Mathematics agnostically: whatever the semantic universe C is, it
is just a parameter in our general theory of all possible semantics.
Various research tracks in categorical algebra, [37], functorial semantics
[45, 35], categorical logic [42], and topos theory [39] that characterised the
last sixty years of research in category theory fit into this perspective.
Our scope here is to recall the fundamental features of Lawvere’s ap-
proach, returning, in subsection 2.3, to a careful analysis of the philosophical
implications of the ‘categories as places’ principle.
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Lawvere’s functorial semantics (LFS) was introduced in the author’s
PhD thesis [45] to provide a categorical axiomatisation of universal algebra,
the part of mathematical logic whose subject is the abstract notion of math-
ematical structure: a semi-classical reference for universal algebra, mingled
with a structuralist perspective, is [53]; see also [67]. For the sake of complete-
ness, a slightly more technical presentation of the basic ideas of LFS is given
in our ?? below; here we aim neither at completeness nor at self-containment.
Everything starts with the following definition:
Definition 2.1. A type T of universal algebra is a pair (T, α) where T is a
set called the (algebraic) signature of the theory, and α a function T → N
that assigns to every element t : T a natural number nt : N called the arity
of the function symbol t.
Definition 2.2. A (universal) algebra of type T is a pair (A, fA) where A
is a set and fA is a function that sends every function symbol t : T to a
function fAt : Ant → A; fAt is called the nt-ary operation on A associated to
the function symbol t : T .
We could evidently have replaces Set with another category C of our
choice, provided the object An : C still has a meaning for every n : N (to
this end, it suffices that C has finite products; we call such a C a Cartesian
category). A universal algebra of type T in C is now a pair (A, fA) where
A : C and fA : ∏t:T C(Ant , A); it is however possible to go even further,
enlarging the notion of ‘type of algebra’ even more.
The abstract structure we are trying to classify is a sketch (the termi-
nology is neither new nor inexplicable: see [25, 21, 8]) representing the most
general arrangement of operations fA : An → A and properties thereof2 that
coexist on an object A; such a sketch is pictorially represented as a (rooted
and directed) graph, modeling arities of the various function symbols deter-
mining a given type of algebra T (see also [33, XV.3] for the definition of
variety of algebras).
The main intuition of Lawvere’s [45] was that these algebras of type T
can be described through category theory, by means of a syntax-VS-semantics
dialectic opposition: to every algebraic theory T we can attach a category
that realises the set of abstract operations t ∈ T as a certain graph, and
consequently as a category. The category LT is the theory associated to T; in
a suitable sense, T is generated by a single object [1] and its iterated powers
[n] := [1]n.
To this category one can attach a category of models, that realise every
possible way in which the abstract structure of LT can be interpreted in a
concrete set: a model for LT is just a functor
M : LT → Set
2Examples of such properties are (left) alternativity: for all x, y, z, one has
fA(x, fA(x, y)) = fA(fA(x, x), y); associativity: fA(x, fA(y, z)) = fA(fA(x, y), z); com-
mutativity: fA(x, y) = fA(y, x); and so on.
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that strictly preserves products, and thus is completely determined by its
action on [1]: each M [n] is indeed M [1]n.
Remark 2.3. More concretely, there is a ‘theory of groups’. Such a theory
determines a graph GGrp built in such a way to generate a category L = LGrp
with finite products. Models of the theory of groups are functors L → Set
uniquely determined by the image of the ‘generating object’ [1] (the set G =
G[1] is the underlying set, or the carrier of the algebraic structure in study;
in our Definition 2.1 the carrier is just the first member of the pair (A, fA));
the request that G is a product preserving functor entails that if L is a theory
and G : L → Set one of its models, we must have G[n] = Gn = G×G×· · ·×G,
and thus each function symbol f : [n]→ [1] describing an abstract operation
on G receives an interpretation as a concrete function f : Gn → G.
Until now, we interpreted our theory L in sets; but we could have chosen
a different category C at no additional cost, provided C was endowed with
finite products, to speak of the object An = A× · · · ×A for all n : N. In this
fashion, we obtain the C-models of L, instead of its Set-models: formally, and
conceptually, the difference is all there.
Yet, the freedom to disengage language and meaning visibly has deep
consequences: suddenly, and quite miraculously, we are allowed to speak of
groups internal to the category of sets, i.e. functors LGrp → Set, topological
groups, i.e. functors LGrp → Top (so multiplication and inversion are con-
tinuous maps by this very choice, without additional requests); we can treat
monoids in the category of R-modules, i.e. R-algebras [18, IV], and monoids
in the category of posets (i.e. quantales [62]) all on the same conceptual
ground.
It is evident that LT is the same in all our choices; all that changes is
the semantic universe in which the theory acquires meaning. This context-
dependent definition of ‘structure’ inspires our stance towards ontology, as
the reader will notice throughout our section 5 and section 6.
2.2. The roˆle of toposes
Among many different Cartesian categories in which we can interpret a given
theory L, toposes play a special roˆle; this is mostly because the internal
language every topos carries (in the sense of Definition 4.1) is quite expressive.
To every theory L one can associate a category, called the free topos
E(L) on the theory (see [42]), such that there is a natural bijection between
the F-models of L, in the sense of Remark 2.3, and (a suitable choice of)
morphisms of toposes3 E(L)→ F :
Mod(L,F) ∼= hom(E(L),F).
3We refrain to enter the details of the definition of a morphism of toposes, but we glimpse
at the definition: given two toposes E,F a morphism (f∗, f∗) : E → F consists of a pair
of adjoint functors (see [7, 3]) f∗ : E  F : f∗ with the property that f∗ commutes with
finite limits (see [7, 2.8.2]).
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In the present subsection we analyse how the construction of models of L
behaves when the semantics takes value in a category of presheaves.
Let’s start stating a plain tautology, that still works as blatant moti-
vation for our interest in toposes opposed as more general categories for our
semantics. Sets can be canonically identified with the category [1,Set], so
models of L are tautologically identified to its [1,Set]-models. It is then quite
natural to wonder what L-models become when the semantics is taken in
more general functor categories like [C,Set]. This generalisation is compelling
to our discussion: if C = I is a discrete category, we get back the well-known
category of variable sets Set/I of Proposition 3.1.
Now, it turns out that [C,Set]-model for an algebraic theory L, defined
as functors L → [C,Set] preserving finite products, correspond precisely to
functors C → Set such that each FC is a L-model: this gives rise to the
following ‘commutative property’ for semantic interpretation:
L-models in [C,Set] are precisely those models C → Set that take
value in the subcategoryModL(Set) of models for L. In other words
we can ‘shift’ the Mod(−) construction in and out [C,Set] at our
will:
ModL([C,Set]) ∼= [C,ModL(Set)]
As the reader can see, the procedure of interpreting a given ‘theory’
inside an abstract finitely complete category K is something that is only
possible when the theory is interpreted as a category, and when a model of
the theory as a functor. This part of Mathematics goes under many names:
the one we will employ, i.e. categorical, or functorial, semantics [45], but also
internalisation of structures, categorical algebra.
The internalisation paradigm sketched above suggests how ‘small’ math-
ematicians often happily develop their Mathematics without ever exiting a
single (large) finitely complete category K, without even suspecting the pres-
ence of models for their theories outside K. To a category theorist, ‘groups’ as
abstract structures behave similarly to the disciples of the sect of the Phoenix
[9]: ‘the name by which they are known to the world is not the same as the
one they pronounce for themselves.’ They are a different, deeper structure
than the one intended by their users.
By leaving the somewhat unsatisfying picture that ‘all categories are
small’ and by fixing a semantic universe like Set), every large category works
as a world in which one can speak mathematical language (i.e. ‘study models
for the theory of Ω-structures’ as long as Ω is one of our abstract theories).
So, categories truly exhibit a double nature: they are the theories we
want to study, but they also are the places where we want to realise those
theories; looking from high enough, there is plenty of other places where one
can move, other than the category Set of sets and functions (whose existence
is, at the best of our knowledge, the consequence of a postulate; we similarly
posit that there exists a model for ETAC). Small categories model theories,
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they are syntax, in that they describe a relational structure using composi-
tionality; but large categories offer a way to interpret the syntax, so they are
a semantics. Our stance is that a large relational structure is fixed once and
for all, lying on the background, and allows for all other relational structures
to be interpreted.
It is nearly impossible to underestimate the importance of this disen-
gagement: syntax and semantics, once separated and given a limited ground
of action, acquire their meaning.4
More technically, in our Definition 4.1 we recall how this perspective al-
lows interpreting different kinds of logic in different kinds of categories: such
an approach leads very far, to the purported equivalence between different
flavours of logics and different classes of categories; the particular shape of
semantics that you can interpret in K is but a reflection of K’s nice categorical
properties (e.g., having finite co/limits, nice choices of factorisation systems
[7, 5.5], [30], a subobject classifier; or the property of the posets Sub(A) of
subobjects of an object A of being a complete, modular, distributive lat-
tice. . . ).
In light of Definition 4.1, this last property has to do with the internal
logic of the category: propositions are the set, or rather the type, of ‘elements’
for which they are ‘true’; and in nice cases (like e.g. in toposes), they are also
arrows with codomain a suitable type of truth values Ω).
2.3. Categories are universes of discourse
Somehow, the previous section postulates that category theory as a whole
is ‘bigger than Mathematics itself’, and it works as one of its foundations;
a category is just (!) a totality where all Mathematics can be re-enacted; in
this perspective, ETAC works as a meta-language in which we develop our
approach. This is not very far from current mathematical practice, and in
particular from Mac Lane’s point of view expressed in
We [can think] ‘ordinary’ Mathematics as carried out exclusively
within [a universe] U (i.e. on elements of U) while U itself and sets
formed from U are to be used for the construction of the desired
large categories. [51, I.6]
since the unique large category we posit is ‘the universe’. But this ap-
proach goes further, as it posits that mathematical theories are in themselves
mathematical objects, and as such, subject to the same analysis we perform
on the object of which those theories speak about.
Such an approach has many advantages:
• If ontologies are mathematical objects, the discipline can be approach-
able with a problem-solving attitude: answers to its problems are at
least to some extent quantitatively determined; cf. our section 5 for a
4Of course, this is dialectical opposition at its pinnacle, and certainly not a sterile approach
to category theory; see [47] for a visionary account of how ‘dialectical philosophy can be
modelled mathematically’.
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tentative roundup of examples in this direction. There is an undeniable
computational content is such discussion, that is absent from “usual”
treatments of this matter. The only explanation is that when a more
expressive, objective language is adopted, ontology acquires a quantita-
tive content.
• The possibility of reading theories in terms of relations allows to suspend
ontological commitment on the nature of objects. They are given, but
just as embedded in a relational structure; this relational structure, a
category modelling the ontology in study, is the subject of our discourse,
and not the entities themselves.
This perspective is sketched in our section 6. This allows a sharper,
more precise, and less time-consuming conceptualisation process for on-
tology’s subjects of study; if it is regarded as (the internal language of)
a category, ontology suddenly becomes a context-dependent entity, i.e.
dependent on the relational structure in which it is located. There are
many categories, each of which describes the web of relations to which
the objects thereof are subject.5
• Weak structuralism, i.e. a structuralist view kept at an informal, meta-
theoretical level, is more than enough to appreciate the merits of seeing
objects as interacting relata and not just as monadic particles.
To put it simply, one isn’t forced to unconditionally adopt a hard-
core-structuralist foundation such as e.g. structural realism [4, 27] to
profit from category theoretic arguments; a similar attitude towards
foundations is widespread in mathematical practice: many people do
structural Mathematics without even knowing, or worrying about, the
subtleties of what a purely structuralist foundation implies (cf. Re-
mark 1.1). And this for the simple reason that structural Mathematics
‘just works’: structural theories are easier to grok, they are modular,
resilient to change, concise, easier to explain, they outline hidden pat-
terns.
Our main point is that the majority of, if not all, theories of existence seem
burdened by the impossibility to disentangle existence from a ‘context of
existence’ bounding in what sense, and relative to what things ‘are’.
But now, the super-exponential progress of Mathematics along the 20th
century can only be explained by the general, collective promotion of the
belief that things do not ‘exist’ in themselves; instead, they do as long as
they are meaningful bricks of relational structures, defining, and defined by,
said building blocks.
As extremist as it may seem, our position fits into an already developed
open debate; see for example the work of J.P. Marquis:
5The tongue-in-cheek is inevitable here, but also explicative: shifting our attention from ob-
jects as monadic particles to the whole category they are embedded into, relations become
more important than relata: objects become subject to mutual interdependence.
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[...] to be is to be related, and the ‘essence’ of an ‘entity’ is given
by its relations to its ‘environment’. [54]
See also
this reproach is empty and one tries to explain the clearer by the
more obscure when giving priority to ontology in such situations
[...]. Structure occurs in dealing with something and does not exist
independently of this dealing. [40]
Sure, structuralism is just a single philosophical current among many
others: but if you do Mathematics, if you study its shape, its history and its
foundations, it is ‘more right than others’ since it profoundly reshaped, alone,
the face of the discipline, unraveling it as the most prominent, most efficient
factory of epistemic knowledge humankind has ever produced.
In our system, ontology does not pose absolute questions, and is con-
tempt with equally partial answers, not as a defeat: relativity of existence is
just inevitable to avoid incurring in annoying paradoxes coming from the uni-
versalist desire to speak about ‘all that there is’. In this perspective something
certainly is lost: as Solomonic as the claim might seem, we posit what is lost
is just a confusing tangle of misunderstandings, caused by the habit of blur-
ring natural and formal languages. Again, a fortunate analogy still involves
foundations of Mathematics: bounding the existence of sets to a hierarchy
of universes undoubtedly loses something. But what is this something? How
can it be probed? In no way: and so, in what sense it ‘exists’, if it is outside
the hierarchy of probe-able entities?
Sure, positing that ‘there is just what hits my probes’ might seem as a
defeat, and the question ‘what is there?’ remains a fertile area of discussion.
We aim at adding but a grain of sand to this infinite seaside of ideas.
Category theory was invented without worrying about foundational is-
sues; they were addressed just later. It effectively and irredeemably changed
the face of Mathematics; we now claim it provides a ‘practical foundation’
for meta-physical problems.
2.4. Existence: persistence of identity?
If, following Quine, ontology studies ‘what there is’, it then appears natural
to define at the outset of our system the notion of existence.
Many approaches are possible to tackle this complicated and fundamen-
tal matter:
• in the Fregean perspective [28] ‘x exists’ if and only if ‘x is identical to
something [e.g., to itself]’, whereas
• for Quine [64] ‘being is being the value of a [bounded] variable’.
The first approach is affine to conceptual realism, but it has scarce infor-
mative power (what is equality? Frege defines existence as self-identity, an
equally perilous concept, and even more, this is not the right track: identity
isn’t a thing; it is a judgment. More: every identity is the result of an iden-
tification process, every equality is an equivalence relation performed onto a
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pre-existing ‘thing’ –of course, regarding existents as the result of a compu-
tation relies on the notion of Bishop set [5, 34]): before the identification, a
Bishop set (S,∼) has elements that are morally more than the elements of the
quotient S/∼. Evidently, turning this suggestion into a precise statement is
complex enough a topic to dedicate it a separate chapter of the present polyp-
tych (in fact, two: [23, 24]). We will attribute to the topic due importance,
in due course.
Quine’s approach inspired the notion of ontological commitment (the
class of objects that ‘we admit to exist’ when we talk about ontology, or
we participate in it) and the subsequent definition of ontology (of a theory)
as the domain of objects on which logical quantifiers vary (cf. [64]): each
ontological theory is committed to the entities on which the quantifiers of its
statements vary.
We will see in subsection 6.3 that the Quinean conception fits in our
categorical ontology perspective as a consequence of a technical procedure
called internalization of theories.
There is a third way, less common in literature but seemingly less ques-
tionable: define existence through persistence over time.
A time-frame is a pair 〈T,<〉 where T is a inhabited type whose terms
are ‘instants’ and < a binary partial order relation. Every ‘temporal type’
X is endowed with a relation on A: X × T : (x, t) 7→ x A t that prescribes
when a term x ‘exists in the time-frame T ’: for each t : T it must be true
that x A t.
This definition captures well one of the intuitive aspects of existence,
relying on both identity (with all the problems this might raise) and time,
thus framed in an appropriate temporal logic ∗TL in which entities ‘persist’.
(It’s easy to write down what the relationship ‘x exists in T ’ means in terms
of linear temporal logic, LTL.)
One of the results of our work is that we can define existence in an
equally intuitive way, but without appealing neither to an identity principle
nor to a time-frame reference; in fact providing a more general concept within
which others can also be retrieved.
We will phrase the question as follows: what is variable relative to x is
the degree, or strength of its existence; ‘classical’ existence can be considered
existence ‘at the highest degree’ in the internal language of the category we
live in (in our section 5, a Borgesian universe); there we will be able to indi-
cate the strength of existence of objects, without assuming to move through
instants of time (as in the example of the nine copper coins of [15] might sug-
gest, cf. Example 5.6) or points in space (such as hro¨nir, cf. Example 5.13).
Depending on the structure of the domain, we can choose the logic that
is most suited to the context for the intuition we have of the universe in
natural language. Persistence over time is therefore not removed from the
description, or denied; rather, it becomes an implicit part of it.
Existence in this conception is nothing more than the ‘mode of presence’
of the objects within a relational model. It is therefore literally defined by
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what we can do with objects, how we can fit them in a sensible web of
relations.
This is not just an operational notion of existence, close to our common
sense: things exist if we can touch them, see them, indirectly measure them
if invisible, based on interactions they have with observable entities, describe
them, count them, use them; and this is independent of how they exist; rather,
our possibility to probe them defines that they exist.
So, things exist since they belong to a category; based on our meta-
theoretical and foundational choices, existence concerns how things relate
to each other. Here is the advantage of categorical thinking in a nutshell:
to exploit structuralism to be able to bind not only our world but distant
realities such as Tlo¨n’s, which is but an example of an element in an ontology
scheme.
The notion of existence on Tlo¨n will presumably be different from our
own:
Things became duplicated in Tlo¨n; they also tend to become ef-
faced and lose their details when they are forgotten. [10]
such obvious and powerful intuition has often been belittled by ontol-
ogists. But once the idea is properly framed, it is possible to measure this
difference precisely. Changing ontology changes the concept of what is there
and how it’s there; we believe our work explicitly clarifies to what extent this
happens, through mathematical language.
Mathematical language happens to be able to quantify how much Earth
and Tlo¨n are different, what is the parameter in the ‘furniture’ of their respec-
tive worlds that has been hacked in order to admit the existence of impossible
entities like group of coins that persist even though no one is observing them.
In the next section, we begin to lay the foundation of mathematical
language needed in §5.
3. Preliminaries on variable set theory
a&yÄAdFEn Buumatra taAEn &yÄm@yAEn BArta ।
a&yÄEnDnAyv ta/ kA pErdvnA ॥ 28॥
S´r¯ımadbhagavadg¯ıta¯ II, 28
The present section introduces the main mathematical tool of our dis-
cussion: the theory of variable sets. Shortly put, a variable set is a family of
sets indexed by another set I, i.e. (more formally) a class function I → Set.
The collection of all such functions forms the object class of a category.
Categories of the form ‘variable sets over I’ are often denoted as Set/I (read
“sets over I”) and they are a particularly rich framework to re-enact Mathe-
matics in its entirety; here and in the next section we explore their structure
of Set/I in full detail.
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We begin by assessing the equivalence between two different but equiv-
alent descriptions of the category of variable sets: as class functions I → Set,
or as functions h : A → I with fixed codomain I (cf. [7, 1.6.1]). In some of
our proofs it will be crucial to blur such a distinction between the category
of functors I → Set and the slice category Set/I; once the following result is
proved, we will freely refer to any of these two categories as the category of
variable sets (indexed by I).
Proposition 3.1. Let I be a set, regarded as a discrete category, and let
SetI be the category of functors F : I → Set; moreover, let Set/I the slice
category. Then, there is an equivalence (actually, an isomorphism when a
coherent choice of coproduct has been made: see [7, 1.5.1]) between SetI and
Set/I.
Proof. Our proof is based on the fact that we can represent the category SetI
as the category of I-indexed families of objects, i.e. with the category whose
objects are (X)I := {Xi | i : I}, and morphisms (X)I → (Y )I the families
{fi : Xi → Yi | i : I}. Given this, the two categories obviously identify, as a
functor F : I → Set amounts to a choice of sets Ai := F (i), and functoriality
reduces to the property that identity arrows in I are mapped to identity
functions Ai → Ai.
Let us consider an object h : X → I of Set/I, and define a function
i 7→ h←(i); of course, (X(h))I := {h←(i) | i : I} is a I-indexed family, and
since I can be regarded as a discrete category, this is sufficient to define a
functor Fh : I → Set.
Let us define a functor in the opposite direction: let F : I → Set be
a functor. This defines a function hF :
∐
i:I Fi → I, where
∐
i:I Fi is the
disjoint union of all the sets Fi.
The claim now follows from the fact that the correspondences h 7→ Fh
and F 7→ hF are mutually inverse.
This is easy to verify: the function FhF sends i : I to the set h←F (i) = Fi,





←(i) = X (as
i runs over the set I, the disjoint union of all preimages h←(i) equals the
domain of h, i.e. the set X). 
Notation 3.2. The present remark is meant to establish a bit of terminology:
by virtue of Proposition 3.1 above, an object of the category of variable sets
is equally denoted pair (A, f : A → I), as a function h : I → Set, or as
the family of sets {h(i) | i : I} = {Ai | i : I}. We call the function f the
structure map of the variable set A, and we call the function Fh the functor
associated, or corresponding, to the variable set in study. Common parlance
almost always blurs the distinction between these objects.
Remark 3.3. A more abstract look at this result establishes the equivalence
Set/I ∼= SetI as a particular instance of the Grothendieck construction (see
[48, 1.1]): for every small category C, the category of functors C → Set is
equivalent to the category of discrete fibrations on C (see [48, 1.1]). In this
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case, the domain C = I is a discrete category, hence all functors E → I are,
trivially, discrete fibrations.
Remark 3.4. The next crucial step of our analysis is the observation that the
category of variable sets is a topos: we break the result into the verification
of the various axioms, as exposed in ?? and ??. Our proof relies on the fact
that the category of sets is itself a topos: in particular, it is cartesian closed,
and admits the set {⊥,>} as subobject classifier.1
Proposition 3.5. The category of variable sets is Cartesian closed in the
sense of [7, p.335].
Proof. We shall first show that the category of variable sets admits products:
this is well-known as in Set/I, products are precisely pullbacks ([7, 2.5.1]);
note that Proposition 3.1 gives an identification between the pullback X×I Y










⇐⇒ i 7→ h←(i) =
{
(x, y) : X ×I Y | h(x, y) = i
}
Now, this yields a canonical bijection h←(i) ∼= f←(i)× g←(i). This is exactly
the definition of the product of the two associated functors Ff , Fg : I → Set.
To complete the proof, we shall show that each functor ×I Y has
a right adjoint Y tI . The functor SetI → SetI : Z 7→ Y tI Z where
Y tI Z : i 7→ Set(Yi, Zi) does the job. This, together with a straightforward
verification, sets up the bijection
X ×I Y // Z
X // Y tI Z
and by a completely analogous argument (the construction (A,B) 7→ A×I B
is of course symmetric in its two arguments), we get a bijection
X ×I Y // Z
Y // X tI Z;
showing that also X ×I has a right adjoint X tI . This concludes the
proof that the category of variable sets is Cartesian closed. 
Proposition 3.6. The category of variable sets has a subobject classifier.
1We choose to employ a classical model of set theory, as opposed to an intuitionistic model
where the classifier Ω consists of a more general Heyting algebra H; a general procedure to
obtain a Ω-many valued logic of set theory is to take the topos E = Sh(H) of sheaves on a
Heyting algebra H: then, there is an isomorphism ΩE ∼= H. The core of all our argument is
very rarely affected by the choice to cut the complexity of our Ω to be the bare minimum;
this is mainly due to expository reasons. The reader shall feel free to replace {⊥,>} with
a more generic choice of Heyting algebra, and they are invited to adapt the arguments of
section section 5 accordingly.
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Proof. From ?? we know that we shall find a variable set Ω such that there
is a bijection
χ : A // Ω
SubI(A)
where SubI(A) denotes the set of isomorphism classes of monomorphisms into
A, in the category of variable sets.2 For the sake of simplicity, for the rest of
the proof we fix as category of variable sets the slice Set/I.
From this we make the following guess: as an object of Set/I, Ω is the
canonical projection piI : I×{⊥,>} → I. We are thus left with the verification
that piI has the correct structure and universal property.
First, we shall find a universal monomorphism t : ∗ → Ω in Set/I.
Unwinding the definitions (in particular, since the identity function idI :
I → I is evidently the terminal object in Set/I), such a map amounts to an
injective function I → Ω having the projection piI : Ω× I → I as left inverse.
It turns out that the function I → I × {⊥,>} choosing the top-level
copy of I ∼= I × {>} plays the roˆle of t: in the following, we shortly denote













in Set/I is given by an injective










is easily seen to be a pullback; in fact, every morphism of variable sets χS :
A→ ΩI must send the element a : A to a pair (i, ) : I×{⊥,>}. The pullback
of χ and t, as defined above, consists of the subset of the product A× I such
that χ(a) = t(i) = (i,>); this defines a variable set S = (χ(i,>))I , and such
a correspondence is clearly invertible: every variable set arises in this way,






)→ (ΩI , piI):
χS(a) =
{
(f(a),>) if a : S
(f(a),⊥) if a : Ar S
This concludes the proof of the fact that Set/I admits a subobject classifier.

2A monomorphism into A as an object of SetI is nothing but a family of injections si :
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Remark 3.7. A straightforward but important remark is now in order. The
structure of subobject classifier of ΩI , and in particular the shape of a char-
acteristic function χS : A→ ΩI for a subobject S ⊆ A in Set/I, is explicitly
obtained using the structure map f of the variable set f : A→ I.
This will turn out to be very useful along our main section, where we
shall note that a proposition in the internal language of Set/I amounts to
a function p : U → ΩI , having as domain a variable set u : U → I, whose
structure map uniquely determines the “strength” (see Remark 5.1) of the
proposition p. In a nutshell, p(x) is a truth value in ΩI ; the fact that p is
a morphism of variable sets however forces this truth value to be (u(x), ) :
I×{⊥,>}. We invite the baffled reader not to worry now; we will duly justify
each of these conceptual steps along section 5 and 4.
Proposition 3.8. The category of variable sets is cocomplete and accessible.
Proof. Cocompleteness can be shown appealing to a classical argument: if
C is a small category, and D a cocomplete category, the category DC of all
functors F : C → D is cocomplete, and colimits are computed pointwise,
meaning that given a diagram J → DC of functors Fj , colimFj : DC is the
functor C 7→ colimJ Fj(C) (that exists in D by assumption). Given that
Set/I ∼= SetI , and that the category Set is cocomplete, we obtain the result.
Accessibility is a corollary of Yoneda lemma in the following form: every
F : I → Set is a colimit of representables
F ∼= colim
(
E(F ) Σ−→ I y−→ SetI
)
(the category of elements [7] E(F ) of F : SetI is small because in this case
E(F ) ∼= ∐i:I Fi). 
Corollary 3.9. The category of variable sets is a Grothendieck topos.
4. The internal language of variable sets
I am hard but I am fair; there is no racial bigotry
here. [. . .] Here you are all equally worthless.
GySgt Hartman
Definition 4.1. The internal language of a topos E is a formal language
defined by types and terms; suitable terms form the class of variables. Other
terms form the class of formulæ.
• Types are the objects of E
• Terms of type X are morphisms of codomain X, usually denoted with
Greek letters α, β, σ, τ, . . . : U → X.
– Suitable terms are variables: the identity arrow ofX ∈ E is the vari-
able x : X → X. For technical reasons we shall keep a countable
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number of variables of the same type distinguished:1 x, x′, x′′, . . . :
X → X are all interpreted as 1X .
• Generic terms may depend on multiple variables; the domain of a term
of type X is the domain of definition of a term.
A number of inductive clauses define the other terms of the language:
• the identity arrow of an object X ∈ E is a term of type X;
• given terms σ : U → X and τ : V → Y there exists a term 〈σ, τ〉 of type








U × Y // X × Y
• Given terms σ : U → X, τ : V → X of the same type X, there is a term
[σ = τ ] : W
〈σ,τ〉−−−→ X ×X δX−−→ Ω, where δX : X ×X → Ω is defined as
the classifying map of the mono X ↪→ X ×X.
• Given a term σ : U → X and a term f : X → Y , there is a term
f [σ] := f ◦ σ : U → Y .
• Given terms θ : V → Y X and σ : U → X, there is a term
W 〈θ, σ〉 −→ Y X ×X ev−→ Y
• In the particular case Y = Ω, the term above is denoted
[σ ∈ θ] : W 〈θ, σ〉 → Ω
• If x is a variable of type X, and σ : X × U → Z, there is a term
λx.σ : U
η−→ (X × U)X σ
X
−−→ ZX
obtained as the mate of σ.
These rules can of course be also presented as the formation rules for a
Gentzen-like deductive system: let us rewrite them in this formalism.
1X : X → X id
σ : U → X τ : V → Y
〈σ, τ〉 : W 〈θ, σ〉 → X × Y Π
σ : U → X τ : V → X
[σ = τ ] : W → Ω eq
σ : U → X f : X → Y
f [σ] : U → Y comp
θ : V → Y X σ : U → X
W 〈θ, σ〉 −→ Y X ×X ev−→ Y
ev x : X σ : X × U → Z
λx.σ = σX ◦ η : U → (X × U)X → ZX λ-abs
To formulas of the language of E we apply the usual operations and rules of
first-order logic: logical connectives are induced by the structure of internal
Heyting algebra of Ω: given formulas ϕ,ψ we define
• ϕ ∨ ψ is the formula W 〈ϕ,ψ〉 → Ω× Ω ∨−→ Ω;
1These technical reasons lie on the evident necessity to be free to refer to the same free
variable an unbounded number of times. This can be formalised in various ways: we refer
the reader to [42] and [39].
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• ϕ ∧ ψ is the formula W 〈ϕ,ψ〉 → Ω× Ω ∧−→ Ω;
• ϕ⇒ ψ is the formula W 〈ϕ,ψ〉 → Ω× Ω ⇒−→ Ω;
• ¬ϕ is the formula U → Ω ¬−→ Ω.
Universal quantifiers admit an interpretation in the Mitchell-Be´nabou
language of E : the following definition comes from [52, VI].
Definition 4.2. Let E be a topos, and let ϕ : U × V → Ω be a formula
defined on a product type U × V . The variable u : U can be now quantified
over yielding a new formula
∀u.ϕ(u, v) : V → Ω
which no longer contains u as a free variable.
The term ∀u.ϕ(u, v) is obtained by composition of λu.ϕ(u, v) : V →
V → ΩU with the unique right adjoint ∀t : ΩU → Ω to the precomposition








with the left adjoint ∃t a t.
Each formula ϕ : U → Ω defines a subobject {x | ϕ} ⊆ U of its domain
of definition; this is the subobject classified by ϕ, and must be thought as
the subobject where “ϕ is true”.
If ϕ : U → Ω is a formula, we say that ϕ is universally valid if {x | ϕ} ∼=
U . If ϕ is universally valid in E , we write “E  ϕ” (read: “E believes in ϕ”).
Examples of universally valid formulas:
• E  [x = x]
• E  [(x ∈X {x | ϕ}) ⇐⇒ ϕ]
• E  ϕ if and only if E  ∀x.ϕ
• E  [ϕ⇒ ¬¬ϕ]
Let us now glance at the internal language of variable sets. This will turn out
to be the cornerstone for the analysis in section 5.
Here we just unwind Definition 4.1 at its very surface; we invite the
reader to endeavour in the instructive exercise to fill all details properly.















2The arrow t : U → 1 is the terminal map, and t∗ : Ω1 → ΩU is induced by precomposition;
it sends a term x : Ω to the constant function t∗x = λu.x.
28 Dario Dentamaro† and Fosco Loregian‡
Given this, we define
• product terms as functions σ : U1 ×I U2 ×I · · · ×I Un → X;
• terms 〈σ, τ〉 obtained as the (diagonal map in the) pullback
W 〈σ, τ〉

// X ×I V






I ×I I ∼= I
• terms [σ = τ ], obtained as compositions
W 〈σ, τ〉 〈σ,τ〉 // X ×I Y δX // ΩI
where δX : X ×I X → Ω classifies the mono m : X → X ×I X obtained






The cartesian closed structure of Set/I (cf. Proposition 3.5) yields terms (we
denote BA := A t B in the notation of Proposition 3.5)
• [σ ∈ θ] : W 〈θ, σ〉 → Y X ×I X → ΩI from suitable σ, θ;
• U → (X ×I U)X σ
X
−−→ ZX (λ-abstraction on x : X) from a suitable
σ : X ×I U → Z.
Quantifiers can be deduced in a similar way, starting from their general
definition in Definition 4.2.
Remark 4.4. Like every other Grothendieck topos, the category Set/I has
a natural number object (see [52, VI.1], [42, p.46]); here we shall outline its
construction. It is a general fact that such a natural number object in the
category of variable sets, consists of the constant functor on N : Set, when we
realise variable sets as functors I → Set: thus, in fibered terms, the natural
number object is just piI : N× I → I.
A natural number object provides the category E it lives in with a
notion of recursion and with a notion of E-induction principle: namely, we
can interpret the sentence(
Q0 ∧∧i≤nQi⇒ Q(i+ 1))⇒ ∧n:NQn
for every Q : N→ ΩI .
In the category of variable sets, the universal property of piI : N×I → I
amounts to the following fact: given any diagram of solid arrows
I
0 // N× I
u

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where every arrow carry a structure of morphism over I (and 0 : i 7→ (0, i),
s × I : (n, i) 7→ (n + 1, i)), there is a unique way to complete it with the
dotted arrow, i.e. with a function u : N× I → X such that
u ◦ (s× I) = f ◦ u.
Clearly, u must be defined by induction: if it exists, the commutativity of the
left square amounts to the request that u(0, i) = x(i) for every i : I. Given
this, the inductive step is
u(s(n, i)) = u(n+ 1, i) = f(u(n, i)).
This recursively defines a function with the desired properties; it is clear that
these requests uniquely determine u.
Such a terse exposition does not exhaust such a vast topic as recursion
theory conducted with category-theoretic tools. The interested reader shall
consult [36] for a crystal-clear introductory account, and [19, 20] for more
recent and modern development of recursion theory.
Remark 4.5. The object of natural numbers of Set/I is easily seen to match
the definition of the initial object [7, 2.3.1] of the category Dyn/I so defined:
• the objects of Dyn/I are dynamical systems in Set/I, i.e. the triples
(x,X, f), where X : Set/I (say, with structure map ξ : X → I), x :
(I, idI)→ (X, ξ) and f : X → X is an endo-morphism of variable sets;
• given two dynamical systems (x,X, f) and (y, Y, g) a morphism between
them is a function u : X → Y such that the diagram in (4.1) commutes
in all its parts.
The reason why such a triple (x,X, f) identifies as a (discrete) dynamical
system is easily seen: the function x : I → X works as initial seed for a
recursive application of f , in such a way that every f : X → X defines a
sequence
un+1 := f(un)
of its iterates. The system now lends itself to all sorts of questions: is there
a fixed point for un(x)? Does the limit of un(x) belong to X (not obvious:
consider X = [0, 1[ and un(x) ≡ 1− 1n )? Is un(x) continuous in x? Etc.
5. Nine copper coins, and other toposes
Explicaron que una cosa es igualdad, y otra
identidad, y formularon una especie de reductio
ad absurdum, o sea el caso hipote´tico de nueve
hombres que en nueve sucesivas noches padecen
un vivo dolor. ¿No ser´ıa rid´ıculo -interrogaron-
pretender que ese dolor es el mismo?
JLB —Tlo¨n, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius
The main result of the present section is a roundup of examples showing
that it is possible to concoct categories of variable sets Set/I where some
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seemingly paradoxical constructions coming from J.L. Borges’ literary world
have, instead, a perfectly ‘classical’ behaviour when looked in the internal
logic of Set/I.
Each of the examples in our roundup Example 5.6, 5.12, 5.13 is organised
as follows: we recall the statement in Borges’ words. Then, we exhibit a topos
in which the statement becomes admissible, when expressed in its internal
language.
5.1. Choosing an internal logic
According to our description of the Mitchell-Be´nabou language in the cate-
gory of variable sets, propositions are morphisms of the form
p : U → ΩI
where ΩI is the subobject classifier of Set/I described in Proposition 3.6;
now, recall that
• the object ΩI = Ω0 × I → I becomes an object of Set/I when endowed
with the projection piI : ΩI → I on the second factor of its domain (Ω0
is the subobject classifier of Set, having a top element > and a bottom
element ⊥);
• the universal monic t : I → ΩI consists of a section of piI , precisely the
one that sends i : I to the pair (i, 1) : ΩI ;

















(see Proposition 3.6 for a complete proof).
The set I in this context acts as a multiplier of truth values, in that every
proposition can have a pair (, t) as truth value:  is the truth value, ‘amplified’
by t : I.
We introduce the following notation: a proposition p : U → ΩI is true
(resp. false), in context x : U , with strength t, if p(x) = (1, t) (resp., p(x) =




p x : U
t
¬p.
This notation is extensible in the obvious way:
• ~x : U
t
p means that p(x1, . . . , xn) = (1, t) for p : U = U1×· · ·×Un →
ΩI and ~x = (x1, . . . , xn) : U ;
• x : U
t
p1, . . . , pn means that for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n one has pi(x) =
(1, t);
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every other combination is similarly defined.
This notation is chosen in order not to make explicit reference to the
set of truth values we take for our background logic in Set; all the results
that we state independent from the assumption that the subobject classifier
Ω0 of Set is the usual two-element Boolean algebra {0 < 1}. (This will be,
however, our natural choice.)





p( , b) b
t
p(a, )




This is not accidental; however, we will not say more on the structure of the
deductive system so generated, as it would derange us from our main topic
of discussion.
Remark 5.1. A proposition in the internal language of variable sets is a
morphism of the following kind: a function p : U → ΩI , defined on a certain








(it must be a morphism of variable sets!) This means that pip(x : U) = u(x :
U), so that p(x) = (x, u(x)) for x = 0, 1 and u is uniquely determined by the
‘variable domain’ U . We can succintly denote this fact in the above notation,
writing
x : (U, u)
u(x)
x · p (5.1)
where x · p is p if x = 1, and ¬p otherwise.
This is an important observation: the strength with which p is true/false
is completely determined by the structure of its domain, in the form of the
function u : U → I that renders the pair (U, u) an object of Set/I.
Remark 5.2. To get a concrete grip on the different classes of propositions
we can build in an internal language, it is now convenient to restrain the
structure of I in order to satisfy our intuition that it is a space of strengths:
it is for example possible to equip I with an order structure, or a natural
topology.
Among all such different choices of truth multiplier, yielding different
categories of variable sets, and different kinds of internal logic therein, we will
concentrate our study on I’s that are dense, linear orders with LUP; thus not
really far from being a closed, bounded subset of the real line.1
1There is another more philosophical reason for this assumption, that will appear clear
throughout the section: density of I is meant to allow ‘intersubjective concordance’ between
two interlocutors X and Y . Engaging in a debate on existence of the nine coins, X,Y might
disagree about how strongly some of them exist; the assumption that I is a dense order
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Even if this assumption is never strictly necessary, a natural choice for
I is a continuum (=a dense total order with LUP –see [57]), a basic model
of which is the closed unit interval [0, 1] of the real line.
An alternative choice drops the density assumption: in that case the
(unique) finite total order ∆[n] = {0 < 1 < · · · < n}, or the countable
total order I = ω = {0, 1, 2, . . . , n, . . . } are all pretty natural choices for I
(although it is way more natural for I to have a minimum and a maximum
element).2
Remark 5.3. In each of these cases ‘classical’ logic is recovered as a pro-







In order to aid the reader understand the explicit way in which I ‘mul-
tiplies’ truth values, we spell out explicitly the structure of the subobject
classifier in Set/∆[2]. In order to keep calling the minimum and maximum of
I respectively 0 and 1 we call 12 the intermediate point of ∆[2].
Remark 5.4. The subobject classifier of Set/∆[2] consists of the partially











endowed with the product order. The resulting poset is partially ordered, and
in fact a Heyting algebra, because it results as the product of two Heyting
algebras: the Boole algebra {0 < 1} and the frame of open subsets of the
Sierpin´ski space S´ = ({a, b}, τS) (the topology is τS = {∅, {a}, {a, b}}).
makes it possible to always find an intermediate strength between the one pX , assigned by
X, and the one pY > pX assigned by Y to the same set of coins, as there must be a third
truth value z : pX < z < pY lying between the two.
2We’re only interested in the notion of an abstract interval here: a continuum X endowed
with an operation X → X ∨ X of ‘zooming’, uniquely defined by this property. In a
famous paper Freyd characterises ‘the interval’ as the terminal interval coalgebra: see [29,
§1]; for our purposes, note that [0, 1] is a natural choice: it is a frame, thus a Heyting
algebra H = ([0, 1],∧,∨,⇒) with respect to the pseudo-complement operation given by
(x ⇒ z) := ∨x∧y≤z y (it is immediate that x ∧ a ≤ b if and only if a ≤ x ⇒ b for every
a, b : [0, 1]).
3Here I is represented as an interval whose minimal and maximal element are respectively
0 and 1; of course these are just placeholders, but it is harmless for the reader to visualise
I as the interval [0, 1].
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Remark 5.5. Given that I = [0, 1] endowed with its usual Euclidean topol-
ogy is one of our most natural choices, we explicitly define some interesting
sets obtained out of ΩI or out of a given proposition p : U → ΩI in the
Mitchell-Be´nabou language of Set/[0, 1]:











¬p, tx > 0
} ⊆ U





such that u←0 = ∅.












these are obtained as fibers over the maximal element of I. A useful
shorthand for the judgment
1
is just .
• the two sets
E>t = {x : U t p} ⊆ U










A crucial decision at some point will be about the regularity with which
the strength of p depends with respect to the variables on its domain of
definition. Without a continuous dependence, small changes in context x : U
might drastically change the truth value p(x).4
5.2. The unimaginable topos theory hidden in Borges’ library
Jorge Luis Borges’ literary work is well-known to host paradoxical worlds;
oftentimes, seemingly absurd consequences follow by stretching ideas from
logic and Mathematics to their limits: time, infinity, self-referentiality, dupli-
cation, recursion, the relativity of time, the illusory nature of our perceptions,
eternity as a curse, the limits of language, and its capacity to generate worlds.
In the present section, we choose Fictions, Borges’ famous collection of
novels, as a source of inspiration to put to the test possible and impossible
worlds together with their ontology.
In a few words, Borges’ work generates ‘impossible worlds’: the term
as it is is used in various ways in paraconsistent semantics since the classic
work of Rescher and Brandom [65], where worlds are obtained starting from
‘possible’ ones, through recursive operations on standard Kripkean worlds.
4There is no a priori reason to maintain that p is a continuous proposition; one might
argue that discontinuous changes in truth value of p happen all the time in ‘real life’; see
the family of paradoxes based on so-called separating instants: how well-defined the notion
of ‘time of death’ is? How well-defined the notion of ‘instant in time’?
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Here we claim that interesting consequences originate from reversing
the above perspective: instead of removing from the realm of possibility those
worlds that do not comply with sensory experience tagging them as ‘impos-
sible’, we accept their existence, for bizarre that it may seem, and we try to
deduce ex post, from their very existence, a kind of logic that can consistently
generate them.
The results of our analysis are surprising:
• we unravel how a mathematically deep universe Borges has inadver-
tently created: of the many compromises we had to take in order to
reconcile literature and the underlying Mathematics,5 we believe no one
is particularly far-fetched;
• we unravel how ontological assumptions are context-dependent; they are
not given: using category theory ontology, far from being the presuppo-
sition on which language is based, is a byproduct of language itself. The
more expressive language is, the more expressive ontology becomes; the
fuzzier its capacity to assert truth, the fuzzier ontology becomes;
• since ‘fuzziness’ of existence, i.e. the fact entia exist less than completely,
is hard-coded in the language (in the sense of Definition 4.1) of the
category we decide to work in from time to time, most of the statements
of Tlo¨n’s ontology are paradoxical only when regarded with Earthlings’
eyes; on Tlo¨n they are, instead, perfectly legitimate statements.
To sum up, readers willing to find an original result in this paper might find
it precisely here: we underline how Borges’ alternative worlds (Babylon, Tlo¨n
dots) are mathematically consistent places, worthy of existence as much as
our world, only based on a different internal logic.
5.2.1. Nine copper coins. The first paradox we aim to frame in the right
topos is the famous nine copper coins argument, used by the philosophers
of Tlo¨n to construct an impossible object persisting to exist over time, even
without a perceivent that maintains it in a state of being.
Example 5.6 (Nine copper coins). First, we recall the exact statement
of the paradox:6
5See Remark 5.7 below: these compromises mainly amount to assumptions on the behaviour
of space-time on Tlo¨n and Babylon.
6The paradox appears in a primitive, mostly unchanged version in [13], where instead of
nine copper coins, a single arrow, shot by an anonymous archer, disappears among the
woods. For what concerns Tlo¨n’s nine copper coins, our translation comes from [15]:
Tuesday, X crosses a deserted road and loses nine copper coins. On Thursday, Y finds in
the road four coins, somewhat rusted by Wednesday’s rain. On Friday, Z discovers three
coins on the road. On Friday morning, X finds two coins in the corridor of his house. The
heresiarch would deduce from this story the reality - i.e., the continuity - of the nine coins
which were recovered.
It is absurd (he affirmed) to imagine that four of the coins have not existed between Tuesday
and Thursday, three between Tuesday and Friday afternoon, two between Tuesday and
Friday morning. It is logical to think that they have existed - at least in some secret way,
hidden from the comprehension of men - at every moment of those three periods.
Categorical Ontology I: Existence 35
El martes, X atraviesa un camino desierto y pierde nueve monedas
de cobre. El jueves, Y encuentra en el camino cuatro monedas, algo
herrumbradas por la lluvia del mie´rcoles. El viernes, Z descubre
tres monedas en el camino. El viernes de man˜ana, X encuentra
dos monedas en el corredor de su casa. El quer´ıa deducir de esa
historia la realidad -id est la continuidad- de las nueve monedas
recuperadas.
Es absurdo (afirmaba) imaginar que cuatro de las monedas
no han existido entre el martes y el jueves, tres entre el martes y la
tarde del viernes, dos entre el martes y la madrugada del viernes.
Es lo´gico pensar que han existido -siquiera de algu´n modo secreto,
de comprensio´n vedada a los hombres- en todos los momentos de
esos tres plazos.
Before going on with our analysis, it is important to remark that there is
one and only one reason why the paradox of the nine copper coins is invalid:
copper does not rust. Incidentally, we will be able to propose a rectification
of this ‘rust counterargument’ without appealing to the cheap assumption
that copper can rust on Tlo¨n due to a purported difference between Earth’s
and Tlo¨nian chemistry.
Expressed in natural language, our solution to the paradox goes more
or less as follows: X loses their coins on Tuesday, and the strength ϕ with
which they ‘exist’ lowers; it grows back in the following days, going back
to a maximum value when X retrieves two of their coins on the front door.
Y finding of other coins raises their existence strength to a maximum. The
coins that Y has found rusted (more precisely, with their surface slightly
oxidized: this is possible, but water is rarely sufficient to ignite the process
alone –certainly not in the space of a few hours).
Remark 5.7. In this perspective, Tlo¨n classifier of truth values can be taken
as ΩI = {0 < 1}×I, where I is any set with more than one element; a minimal
example can be I = {N,S},7 but as explained in Remark 5.7 a more natural
choice for our purposes is the closed real interval I = [0, 1].
This allows for a continuum of possible forces with which a truth value
can be true or false; it is to be noted that [0, 1] is also the most natural place
on which to interpret fuzzy logic, albeit the interest for [0, 1] therein can be
easily and better motivated starting from probability theory.8
We now start to formalise properly what we said until now. To set our
basic assumptions straight, we proceed as follows:
• Without loss of generality, we can assume the set C = {c1, . . . , c9} of
the nine coins to be totally ordered and partitioned in such a way that
7Justifying this choice from inside Tlo¨n is easy: the planet is subdivided into two hemi-
spheres; each of which now has its own logic ‘line’ independent from the other.
8Tangential to our discussion might be the fact that there are interesting perspective on
how to develop basic measure theory out of [0, 1]. For example, measures valued in things
like Banach space and more general topological vector spaces have been considered.
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the first two coins are those retrieved by X on Tuesday, the subsequent
four are those found by Y on their way, and the other three are those
seen by Z on Friday. So,
C = CX unionsq CY unionsq CZ
and CX = {cX1, cX2}, CY = {cY 1, cY 2, cY 3, cY 4}, CZ = {cZ1, cZ2, cZ3}
As already said, the truth multiplier I is the closed interval [0, 1] with
its canonical order –so with its canonical structure of Heyting algebra,
and if needed, endowed with the usual topology inherited by the real
line.
• Propositions of interest for us are of the following form:
λgcd.p(g, c, d) : {X,Y, Z} × C ×W → ΩI
where W ⊆ {S , M , Tu , W , Th , F , Sa} is a set of days (strictly speaking,
the paradox involves just the interval between Tu (Tuesday) and F
(Friday). The value p(g, c, d) models how in g’s frame of existence the
coin c exists at day d with strength p(g, c, d).
Definition 5.8 (Admissible configuration). We now define an admissible
configuration of coins any arrangement of C such that the following two
conditions are satisfied:
ad) for all day d and coin c, we have
(g, c, d) : G× C ×W p
where we denote as ‘sum’ the logical conjunction in ΩI : this means
that day by day, the global existence of the group of coins constantly
attains the maximum; it is the local existence that lowers when the
initial conglomerate of coins is partitioned.












p( , cZ , ),
meaning that, for example in the first case,
∑
cX
p(X, cX , F ) = (>, 1).
In an admissible configuration the subsets CX , CY , CZ can only attain an
existence p(g, c, d)  (>, 1); that is to say, no coin completely exists locally.
But for an hypothetical external observer, capable of observing the system,
adding up the forces with which the various parts of C exist, the coins globally
exist ‘ in some secret way, of understanding forbidden to men’ (or rather, to
X,Y, Z).
Remark 5.9. Lest the reader think our construction is just a sleight of
hand leaving open the main problem posed by the coin riddle, an important
clarification is now in order: where do the coins exist? This is a problematic
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W Th FTu Sa
1/5
p(Y, cY ) = (>, 1)
1/4
,
Figure 1. A pictorial representation of the truth forces of
coins in different days; we choose a minimally complex model
where strength of existence goes up and down to join the
points where [15] gives complete information about the coins’
configuration. X is marked in red, Z in yellow, Y in blue.
Time is considered as a continuum line, marked at weekdays
for readability.
question. Tlo¨n’s idealist might deny time (our model makes no strong assump-
tion on what time is made of: discrete, continuous, homogeneous, slowed by
traveling at high speed. . . ); B> ontologists live comfortably in B>, as de-
fined in Remark 5.5 without being able to tell anything about how objects
‘completely do not exist’.
At the opposite side of the spectrum the pure empiricist lives in B⊥,
and they’re unable to tell how they ‘completely exist’).
This is where our analysis comes in handy; in particular, this is where
our particular choice of ΩI plays its roˆle. In our model B⊥, B> both result
as disjoint sum of slices, each of which collects the particular fibers E⊥t , E>t








t is a genuinely better approach than
just considering B⊥, B> as atomic, since it yields a precise quantification of
how much something does (not) exist, framing both B>- and B⊥-ontologies
as opposite sides of a spectrum made out of diverse colours.
Example 5.10. An example of an admissible configuration of coins is the
following (cf. Figure 1): we assume strength of existence varies joining the
points where [10] gives us complete information about the existence status of
CX , CY , CZ above: in the remaining instants of time, the coins out of sight
for X share an equal amount of existence in such a way that constraints ad
and ad above are satisfied: in this particular example, p(Y, cY , Th ) = (>, 1),
whereas p(X,CX , Th ) = p(Z,CZ , Th ) = (>, 1/5), and p(Y, cY , F ) = (>, 1/4),
whereas p(X,CX , F ) = p(Z,CZ , F ) = (>, 1).
Certainly the reader will have fun finding different possible admissible
configurations of coins, and building themselves additional details to enrich
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the bare story ofX,Y, Z (for example: can the cardinality of {X,Y, Z} depend
on I? If yes, how?).
5.2.2. Continuity and discontinuity. Continuity and discontinuity of a
proposition p : U → Ω[0,1] now capture quite well other pieces of Borges’
literary universe: here we provide two examples. We refrain from a deep,
quantitative analysis, and we invite the reader to fill the details of our rea-
soning as a pleasant re-reading exercise of [14] and [15].9
Remark 5.11 (Continuity for a proposition). Let p : U → ΩI be a
proposition; here we investigate what does it mean for p to be (globally)
continuous with respect to the Euclidean topology on I = [0, 1], in the as-
sumption that its domain of definition U is metrisable (this is true for example
when U is a subset of space-time). The condition is that
∀ > 0, ∃δ > 0 : |x− y| < δ ⇒ |px− py| < .
In layman terms: p is continuous on its domain of definition if its strength
over nearby events can’t change too dramatically.
All elementary topology results apply to such a proposition: for example,
the set of forces with which p is true or false is a connected subset of Ω[0,1],
compact if U was compact.
Example 5.12 (Discontinuity, sapphire from Taprobana). Proposi-
tions p : U → Ω[0,1] that are allowed to be discontinuous in its variables
depend unpredictably from their context: such propositions model seemingly
chaotic events triggered as the end terms of a chain of disconnected prior
events; in fact, if we assume a real base for the domain of p, its continuity
as stated in Remark 5.11 roughly means that events in the same neighbour-
hood –‘near’ in space or temporally contiguous– can’t have too much different
truth/strength values.
A model for such a universe, where ‘terrible consequences’ sometimes
follow from the ‘impersonal drawings, whose purpose is unclear’ character-
ising the Company’s actions: seemingly disconnected (that ‘a sapphire from
Taprobana be thrown into the waters of the Euphrates’; that ‘a bird be re-
leased from the top of a certain tower’; that ‘every hundred years a grain
of sand be added to (or taken from) the countless grains of sand on a cer-
tain beach’), but generating nontrivial dynamics when inserted in a suitable
sequence as in Figure 2.
Let us consider the dynamical system ([0, 1],∇ ◦ p) (see Remark 4.5)
obtained from the iterates of the composition ∇ ◦ p : [0, 1] → [0, 1] (∇ :
IqI → I is the fold map of I, obtained from the identity of I and the universal
property of the coproduct). We start from a proposition p depending on a
free variable t : I; then, p(t) = (u(t), ) : ΩI consists of a strength and a truth
value; but p can be evaluated on u(t) because of (5.1) (u is a continuous
9The plot of [14] in a nutshell is: in Babylon, a lottery game infiltrates reality to the
point that it ends up governing the actions of all men; liberating them from free will while
coorting them into pawns of an infinite, inescapable, unknowable game, governed by an
iron, seemingly chaotic, probabilistic logic.
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endomorphism of a compact metric space; although this is not its universal
property, the fold map ∇ just forgets the truth value, keeping the force):
t : I
u(t)
p u(t) : I
u(u(t))
p . . .
The process can thus be iterated as follows, exploiting the universal property
of the natural number object in Set/I:
∇◦p7→ ∇◦p7→ ∇◦p7→ ∇◦p7→
Figure 2. A dynamical system induced by the Company’s
infinite, impersonal drawings.
It is clear that the limit behaviour of such a sequence strongly depends on the
analytic properties of u (e.g., if u is a contraction, it must have a single fixed
point). A repeated series of drawings can chaotically deform the configura-
tion space on which p is evaluated. There is of course countless termination
conditions on such process p; the series can be periodic, it can stop when p
reaches maximum or minimum force, or a prescribed value, when u reaches
its unique fixed point –if any, or is inside/outside a certain range of forces. . . ;
we leave such speculations to the mystagogues of the Company, or to the
lions of Qaphqa.
Another compelling example is that of the monotonicity of a proposi-
tion depending, say, on a certain number of observers who acknowledge the
‘existence’ of an object R (be it physical or conceptual) in large numbers,
from which very reason the existence of R gains strength.
Example 5.13 (Continuity: a few birds, a horse). Let us consider ob-
jects whose existence strength depends monotonously and continuously from
their parameters: for example a proposition p may be ‘truer’ the more people
observe it, because
things became duplicated in Tlo¨n; they also tend to become effaced
and lose their details when they are forgotten. A classic example
is the doorway which survived so long it was visited by a beggar
and disappeared at his death. At times some birds, a horse, have
saved the ruins of an amphitheater. [15]
In such a situation, we can note that the strength of existence of some
ruins –modeled as it is the more naive to do, like a rigid body R in space–
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Figure 3. On Tlo¨n, there are things that exist stronger
the more you believe in them. This is a consequence of
the strength p( ) monotonically depending on an increasing
variable n (‘trust’ in that existence, ‘belief’ that the impos-
sible tribar exists.)
5.2.3. Changing the geometry of I. To conclude the section, a last –
somewhat dramatic– example. What happens if we change topology on I?
For example, we could brutally forget the Euclidean topology of the closed
interval [0, 1], and regard I as the disjoint union {{t} | t : [0, 1]} of its
points; so, the subobject classifier becomes the disjoint union of [0, 1] copies
of {⊥,>}. (See Figure 4 below for a picture.)
Example 5.14 (Burning fields at the horizon). The main tenet of the
present paragraph is that Berkeley idealism of infinite and disconnected in-
stants of time finds a natural home in our framework if the classifier is chosen
to be the object ΩI =
∐
t:[0,1]{⊥,>}. Such a peculiar logical framework allows
for language to be reshaped in light of Berkeleyan instantaneism: the various
terms of the perceptual bundle are recorded and stockpiled by instantaneous
accretion, by disjoint sum of their constituents. This is exactly what happens
on Tlo¨n for words like ‘round airy-light on dark’ or ‘pale-orange-of-the-sky’;
objects are determined by their simultaneity, instead of their logical depen-
dence: accretion superimposes fictitious meaning on a temporal sequence; it
is just an illusion, a mistake of perception tricked into an illicit interpolation.
Spinoza ascribes to his inexhaustible divinity the attributes of
extension and thought; no one in Tlo¨n would understand the jux-
taposition of the first (which is typical only of certain states) and
the second - which is a perfect synonym of the cosmos. In other
words, they do not conceive that the spatial persists in time. The
perception of a cloud of smoke on the horizon and then of the burn-
ing field and then of the half-extinguished cigarette that produced
the blaze is considered an example of association of ideas. [15]
Instantaneism is, of course, way larger a topic to cover than a paragraph
could do. However, we attempt to scratch the surface of this fascinating
topic in our subsection 6.1 below, where we sketch a possible ‘rebuttal to the
idealist’: it is entirely possible the world is affected in some way by me closing
my eyes: thus, Berkeley has a fragment of a point. Yet, it takes more than
that to make it disappear; thus, Berkeley is obviously wrong.
As always, Truth lies in the middle (of a continuous interval): observa-
tion –or lack thereof– affects beings (more: it affects Being) so that something
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Figure 4. Time as an infinite, and infinitely subdivided,
sequence of distinguished instants: the ‘Berkeley paradox’ of
non existence of causality lives in a certain topos, as nearby
slices Et, Es for small |s− t| give no predictive power on how
(and if) the transition from Et to Es might happen.
changes in the assertion p that ‘Everything exists’ with my eyes open, and
with my eyes closed.
This difference shall be regarded as an infinitesimal dent on p’s strength
of truth, so to let Berkeleyan idealism gain a little ground. Yet, it is improper
to say that the world ‘vanished’. It didn’t for the rest of you.
The best we can say is that p probably depends –monotonically– on
the number of open eyes. After all, objects on Tlo¨n double, triple, they are
cyclically reborn; they vanish as the doorway which survived ‘so long it was
visited by a beggar and disappeared at his death’.
6. Vistas on ontologies
¿No basta un solo te´rmino repetido para
desbaratar y confundir la serie del tiempo? ¿Los
fervorosos que se entregan a una l´ınea de
Shakespeare no son, literalmente, Shakespeare?
[11]
Reached this point, the reader will agree with us that Borges’ literary
world underlies deep mathematical structure, and that this structure is best
appreciated through elementary algebra, analysis and geometry (to assess the
form andmeasure of the universe), and through category theory (to assess the
inferential rules governing form and measure). This literary divertissement,
as naive as it may be, has nonetheless the power to show ontology can be
made a quantitative theory.
We can go further, discussing the –not so– tangential connection that
Borges’ work has with classical idealism a` la Berkeley. With our Example 5.14
in mind, we can safely say Borges has often been fascinated by, and mocked,
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classical idealism (see [11] for an example of how fascination and derision mix
in the same essay).
Even though endeavouring on such a wide ground as classical idealism
isn’t the purpose of our work, Borges regards Tlo¨n’s language and philosophy
as a concrete realisation of Berkeley’s theory of knowledge. We thus find
natural to explore such link with a classical piece of philosophy, as far as it
can be taken, with the eyes of a category theorist.
In the following subsections, we sketch a more wide-ranging plan; surely
a less substantiated one, and yet aimed at laying a foundation for future work,
ours or others’, in a research track that we feel is fertile and promising.
6.1. Answers to the idealist
Let us reconsider Example 5.6; we have already mentioned Berkeley’s famous
view of experience as a perceptual bundle of stimuli that are incapable to
cohere.
In whatever sense it accepts that there are nine coins, Berkeleyan in-
stantaneism asks to cut every ‘non-total’ existence p(g, c, d) < (>, 1) at the
purely false value, so that our notion of admissibility for a configuration of
coins becomes untenable (because we can’t have (c, d)
∑
u p(u, ) for
every (c, d)).
Only what exists completely deserves to be called being. On our side of
the barricade however instantaneism is untenable. Idealism is equally unten-
able, when the word is intended as ‘the belief that what lacks a percipient
conscience must suddenly disappear in thin air’ (and thus, to ensure the world
to exist, there must be God).
However, as strange and counter-intuitive as it may seem, instantaneism
and idealism have their point on Tlo¨n:1 we should then be able to find a
tenable justification for both of them, possibly from within topos theory;
possibly, ‘making no pact with the impostor Jesus Christ’ (cf. [15]).
In the internal language of variable sets Set/I a proposition p takes its
truth values in a much wide spectrum of values, as wide as I; thus, existence
gives way to a more nuanced notion that can be (in)valid with a certain
strength t : I. The language we introduced so far was precisely meant to
quantify this stray from classical logic.
Here, it is meant to quantify how much Berkeley’s ‘cut’ in Example 5.14
is a blunt one, easily falsifiable (to say the least) even on Tlo¨n.
To put it shortly,
i) instantaneism is what we get from the subobject classifier ΩI forgetting
the topology and order structure on I (cf. Remark 5.2), and
i) idealism arises from quotienting one of the copy I × {>} of I × {>,⊥}
to a point (cf. Remark 5.3).
1Somehow, [15] isn’t far from an artificial world built to mock idealism; cf. also [13] and
the famous essay [11] therein.
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The problem is thus phrased in a way that makes its solution completely
natural: just don’t be a 18th century Irish empiricist; if the subobject classifier
of a topos carries additional structure, don’t forget it.
To fix ideas, let’s consider an example. Let’s say two empiricists, that
for lack of a better name are called David and George, discuss about the
truth of the proposition (say, p) ‘the World is there’.
Let us assume that p : U → ΩI depends on a certain number of variables
~x; now, when saying that closing their eyes the world disappears, David and
George claim that p(Y, ) 6= p(X, ), and even more, that ¬p(X, ).
(Note that this is the strongest possible sense in which p ‘is not true’: for
every context x : U , p(X, x) = (⊥, 1).)
A certain number of implicit assumptions are already made here:
• First, that p’s domain of definition splits into a product E × U ′, where
E = {Y,X} is a space of parameters taking into account the state
of George and David’s eyes, and U ′ takes into account ‘the rest of the
world’; so p is evaluated on pairs (e, ~y).
• Second, that every force p(X, ~y) < (>, 1) collapses to the minimum
value ‘completely false’ so that at any (X, ~y) configuration the World
is not there.
Formally, George and David collapsed a certain subset of the classifier ΩI to







(An even more drastic choice would have been to take just the fiber {⊥,>} ∼=
{⊥,>} × {1}, thus falling into classical logic; but we have no information
about George and David’s stance on falsehood.)
Now, what happens at p(Y, ~y), as opposed to what happens at p(X, ~y)?
Strictly speaking, we can’t rule out the possibility that perception is directly
affected by observers (it certainly is on Tlo¨n, in Babylon, or in a quantum
mechanics laboratory); so, George and David closing their eyes somehow
affects the degree of existence of the World. In what way? In classical logic the
choice is forced by LEM; but making the right choice of a topos E there can be
even a large, even continuous, spectrum of different choices. So, the apparent
paradox of idealism can be turned into a safe statement: observation –or
lack thereof– affects beings so that something changes between p(Y, ) and
p(X, ). It does so in a complicated, perhaps even mysterious, but coherent,
way.
Of course, the practice of rewording identity and persistence-in-time
as mathematical notions affects natural language as well. When David and
George close their eyes, they are tricked into believing that the World had
disappeared. But this loss of information is merely induced by the drastic
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quotient map Q above, deleting the set Z> (cf. the notation in Remark 5.5);
on the contrary, if only David and George admitted that there is a continuous
parameter (a ‘strength’) modelling p’s truth in the sense defined here they
would implicitly accept to move towards a nonclassical universe of discourse
(a topos). All that follows from this ‘leap of faith’ in nonclassical logic is mere
calculation.
From inside Tlo¨n, this gives way to the epistemic vision of its inhabi-
tants, where each of X,Y, Z does not know what happens to the coins of the
other observers, and in what secret way C exists as a global entity: without
an awakening about the shape of their formal logic, the topos-theoretic model
is unusable by Tlo¨nians.
Even this superficial analysis is already sufficient to make our point,
that George and David peculiar theory of existence isn’t barred from our
model; on the contrary, it arises as a very specific example of internal logic.
How this is done, follows from a standard procedure in problem-solving:
• First, identify the constraints forcing your choice of I (‘what logic shapes
your I?’ and vice versa ‘what I best approximates the logic you want
to describe?’);
• Given an explicit description of ΩI , compute proposition strength (‘where
are you seeking p to be true/false’, and at which strength?)
Points of evaluation can be provided by a temporal, spatial or any other
kind of reference whatsoever: we are completely agnostic towards the shape
of space-time, towards the structure or the properties of the set it forms;
moreover, every configuration respecting the prescribed constraints is ‘cor-
rect’ from within the topos. Finally, our approach is computational: given
the initial piece of data (for the nine coins: the observer, a subset of coins, a
day of the week) all else necessarily follows from a calculation.
A last observation, to conclude the section: an additional source of ag-
nosticism towards the structure of I was anticipated in subsection 2.4, and
consists in the refusal to adopt a temporal logic framework; we can sometimes
interpret the elements of I as time instants, but this is not an obligation at
all. A presentist, or a Borges’ coherent idealist (capable to deduce from ideal-
ism the nonexistence of time, as in [11]) can establish the truth of p without
renouncing their ontological stance; they are just forced to accept the result
of a calculation.
6.2. Ye shall know them by their fruit
The main point of our paper can be summarised very concisely: an ‘ontol-
ogy’ is a category O, inside which ‘Being unravels’. Every existence theory
shall be reported, and is relative, to a fixed ontology O, the ‘world we live
in’; such existence theory coincides with the internal language L(O) of the
ontology/category (from now on we employ the two terms as synonyms), in
a ‘syntax-semantics like’ adjunction of [61].
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So determined, the internal language of Definition 4.1 an ontology O is
the collection of ‘things that can be said’ about the constituent parts of the
ontology.
If, now, ontology is the study of Being, and if we are structuralist in
the meta-theory (cf. section 1), we cannot know beings but through their
attributes. Secretly, this is just an instance of Yoneda lemma (cf. [7, 1.3.3]),
the statement that the totality of modes of understanding an object X coin-
cides with the totality of modes your language allows you to probe the object
X. In relational structures, objects are known via their modes of interaction
with other objects, and these are modelled as morphisms U → X; Yoneda
lemma posits that we shall ‘know objects by their morphisms’ as we know
types by the terms of that type: an object X : C coincides with the total-
ity of all morphisms U → X, organised in a coherent ‘bundle’ (a functor
C( , X) : C → Set).2
All in all, an ontology is a mode of understanding the attributes of Being:
a category, be it in an Aristotelian or in a structuralist sense. As a consequence
metaontology, i.e. the totality of such ways of understanding, must coincide
with the general theory of such particular modes: with category theory. One
of the greatest merits of category theory is having provided Mathematics
(not its history, not its philosophy, but its practice) with the technical tools
to understand the opposition between general and particular.
We shall say no more on the matter, as every further discussion pertains
to metaontology, and it would derange from an already wide-ranging discus-
sion: let’s just say that questions as ‘where is language’ and what general
principles inspire it might have an anthropological or even neurophysiologi-
cal answer; not a purely ontological (=category-theoretic) one.
6.3. Metaontology
The gist of our Example 5.6 is that X,Y, Z can’t assess the existence of the
coins classically; they just have access to partial information allowing neither
a global statement of existence on the set CX of coins lost by X, nor an
unbiased claim about the meaning thereof. Lost coins in CX are untouched
as a global conglomerate, yet their strength of existence is very likely to enjoy
local changes.
This begs the important questions of to which extent language deter-
mines ontology, to which extent it constrains its expressive power, and to
which extent the inhabitants of Tlo¨n fail to see what is exactly ‘a topos
further’ (e.g., persistence of existence through time).
Let us rewind a bit: according to Quine, ontology is the ‘domain over
which [logical, or natural language’s] quantifiers run’. This is not wrong; it
is even perfectly compatible with our views. The only subtlety is that we
raised the complexity one level up: in our framework, ontology a` la Quine
2The naming convention is not unfortunate: there is indeed a ‘bundle’ over C, in an appro-
priate sense, whose fibers are the slices C/X, linked by re-indexing maps f∗ : C/Y → C/X,
one for each f : X → Y in C.
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still is a category, because (cf. Definition 4.2) a quantifier can be described
as a certain specific kind of functor
∀,∃ : PX → PY
between power-sets regarded as internal categories of our ambient ontology
O; in light of this, it’s easy to imagine this pattern to continue: if Quine
calls meta-ontology what we call ontology, i.e. the meta-category grounding
his propositional calculus is a single ambient category among many, we live
‘one universe higher’ in the cumulative hierarchy of foundations and meta-
foundations: our ontology possesses a higher dimensionality, and harbours
Quinean theory as an internal structure (see ?? for the definition of an in-
ternal category). So, it shall exist, somewhere -at least ‘in some secret way,
hidden from the comprehension of men’ [10]- a language that calls ontology
what we call meta-ontology (and thus a language that declassifies Quine’s to
a sub-ontology –whatever this prefix means).
Finding the bottom of this tower of turtles is the aim of the track of
research, of very ancient tradition, within which we want to insert the present
work.
Of course our work does not make a single comment on how, if, and
when, this ambitious foundational goal can be achieved. We just find remark-
able that framing Quine’s definition in this bigger picture is not far from the
so-called practice of ‘negative thinking’ in category theory: the belief that
a high-dimensional/complex entity can be understood through the analogy
with its low-dimensional/complexity counterparts; see [59, 58] for a minimal
introduction to the principle, [3] for a practical introduction, and see [32] for
what T. Gowers calls ‘backwards generalisation’.
6.4. Conclusion
The circle closes on, and motivates better, our initial foundational choice:
categories and their theory correspond 1:1 to ontology and its theory. How-
ever, countless important issues remain open: in what sense this is satisfying?
In what sense the scope of our analysis is not limited by this choice? What’s
his foundation? Is this a faithful way to describe such an elusive concept as
‘Being’?
None of these questions is naive; in fact, each legitimately pertains to
meta-ontology and has no definitive answer. More or less our stance is as fol-
lows: approaching problems in ontology with a reasonable amount of mathe-
matical knowledge is fruitful. Yet, the problem of what is a foundation for that
Mathematics remains (fortunately!) wide open; it pertains to meta-ontology,
whose ambitious effort is to clarify ‘what there is’. We believe the philoso-
phers’ job to work in synergy with quantitative knowledge, approaching the
issue with complementary tools.
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Appendix A. Category theory
El atanor esta´ apagado -repitio´- y esta´n llenos de
polvo los alambiques. En este tramo de mi larga
jornada uso de otros instrumentos.
[12]
A.1. Fundamentals of CT
Throughout the paper we employ standard basic category-theoretic termi-
nology, and thus we refrain from giving a self contained exposition of ele-
mentary definitions. Instead, we rely on famous and wide-spread sources like
[7, 8, 51, 66, 49, 68].
Precise references for the basic definitions can be found
• for the definition of category, functor, and natural transformation, in [7,
1.2.1], [51, I.2], [7, 1.2.2], [51, I.3], [7, 1.3.1].
• The Yoneda lemma is stated as [7, 1.3.3], [51, III.2].
• For the definition of co/limit and adjunction, in [7, 2.6.2], [51, III.3],
[7, 2.6.6], [51, III.4] (consider in particular the definitions of pullback,
product, terminal object).
• For the definition of accessible and locally presentable category in [8,
5.3.1], [8, 5.2.1], [1].
• Basic facts about ordinal and cardinal numbers can be found in [41];
another comprehensive reference on basic and non-basic set theory is
[38].
• The standard source for Lawvere functorial semantics is Lawvere’s PhD
thesis [45]; more modern accounts are [35].
• Standard references for topos theory are [52, 39]. See in particular [52,
VI.5] and [39, 5.4] for what concerns the Mitchell-Be´nabou language of
a topos.
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